Operational Training and Development in the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service

142. As detailed previously, the TVS implementation will ensure that a blended learning approach, including realistic acquisition, refresher training and continued application of the TfOC framework, meets the organisational training needs of the SFRS. The TFF has been developed to provide a comprehensive approach to developing and maintaining the skills and competencies of personnel, ensuring they are well equipped and trained to perform their crucial roles safely. The TFF supports the TVS and is made up of three key elements, which are training delivery, skills maintenance and training assets. The framework has been developed in accordance with the HSE HSG model of ‘Plan, Do, Check, Act’. ‘Check’ and ‘Act’ have been covered in the performance section of this report. The specific concepts of ‘Plan’ and ‘Do’ will be explored within this section.

143. In relation to ‘Plan’, the TFF details there is a need to define standards and expected outcomes as well as develop a TNA. As detailed previously the Service has clearly defined targets within the PMF, which are measured, monitored and scrutinised. The training function also has a NTS Overarching Principle^[30] document, which details the standard to which all training design and delivery should adhere, and it is designed to ensure that all personnel providing front line operational activities are doing so to the expected level of competence.

144. Detail within each training standard allows individuals to understand the links between their training and all elements of their development. Only these documents, in their most up-to-date edition, provide the accepted standard for training design and delivery. Only the approved materials developed by training staff, associated with each standard should be used to develop staff in line with the standards.

145. The training function work with a set of NTS with lesson plans built from them that detail outcomes. Central to the above process is the production of a suite of SFRS NTS for each identified training family. These documents are published and set out the recognised national pathway to attain competency and maintain currency within each identified skill and attribute. Although not exhaustive, the NTS also detail annualised maintenance training requirements, anticipated frequency of training and the details for any subsequent recertification process.

146. NTS also detail how over-arching accreditation and quality management are built into the training methodology for each skill and attribute. Whilst the training function has evolved across the lifetime of the Service, NTS still remain the critical foundation element for the quality and consistency of training programmes and practices across SFRS. In terms of quality assurance, the ongoing process of continuous review within a document review schedule ensures as much as reasonably practicable that each NTS is procedurally compliant, accurate and up to date.

147. In relation to the current suite of published NTS the training function is currently conducting a systematic review of all SFRS NTS to be conducted across the fiscal years 2025-2026 and 2026-2027. Furthermore, to promote the appropriate level of cross-directorate engagement and also with a view to ensuring alignment with a specified scope and a fixed timeline, the Service has elevated the work to a designated project and is overseen through the formation of a project board.

148. We found that staff were very aware of the NTS and routinely used the associated lesson planners for course delivery. We did encounter instances of lesson plans and course material being out of date and instructors having to skip sections or excuse the poor training material to course attendees. This seemed to be a source of frustration for staff and was synonymous with the issue surrounding staff having to deliver constantly at the expense of review and development processes. The training function detailed that there was also an ongoing process of reviewing all the NTS, which we found to be a positive improvement process and hope that this also brings improvement in the associated training material.

149. The TNA process is essential for identifying and addressing skill gaps. It analyses reports to highlight discrepancies in TOM requirements, schedules courses accordingly, and assigns an LSO area SPOC to oversee training needs and compliance. Now more mature, the process is supported by clear guidance. Previously completed annually, the TNA is now reviewed quarterly using a Microsoft based system, allowing SPOCs to identify required skill sets more accurately. Staff viewed the shift to quarterly reviews positively, noting that it improved accuracy, responsiveness, and flexibility.

150. In relation to the HSG Model and the specific area of ‘Do’, the TFF details that the two main aspects are training delivery and skills maintenance. The aspiration is that training will be delivered through a variety of approaches, including:

• instructor-led training, traditional classroom-based instruction;

• eLearning, delivered primarily through the LCMS platform;

• blended learning, combines face-to-face and eLearning;

• virtual reality provides immersive simulation training;

• on-the-job training, real-time instruction in the actual work environment; and

• external instructors, utilised when appropriate.

151. Core skills are defined as the basic and fundamental skills required for any role. The nature and criticality of these skills is such that they need to be performed instinctively and regularly repeated and/or rehearsed. The core skills syllabus consists of a collection of activities which must be undertaken and demonstrated at defined frequencies. For the purposes of this report core skills also include standard incident types, new and emerging risks as well as any other supporting topics deemed necessary. Examples of core skills may include BA, Fire Behaviour, RTC, Safe Working at Height, Ladders, Electricity etc.

152. Specialist skills are those required by a sub-section of operational personnel only. This may result from the specialist capability and equipment held at the Community Fire Station they are working at or may be allocated to the individual to meet a strategic need. Examples of specialist skills may include Emergency Response Driving (ERD), high reach appliance operator, heavy rescue vehicle operator, marauding terrorist attack, water rescue, rope rescue or animal rescue etc.

153. Core TfOC modules were revised in 2022, with core skills maintenance now delivered over 12 months and advanced skills maintenance over 36 months. Content is provided through LCMS and updated regularly by OCSG, Operational Competence Working Group and the Learning and Electronic Development team. These changes have been well received, with staff reporting that the streamlined modules and improved video content reduce computer-based time and allow greater focus on practical training. The training function appears to be making proactive improvements to this aspect of training delivery.

154. That said, we found that there was still an element of staff who believed the blend of training was moving too far towards digital solutions as opposed to practical. However, the Service believes that a more holistic ‘blended learning’ approach to knowledge and skills maintenance is key to ensuring firefighter safety within a modern FRS. It is understood that the Service is still developing the blended learning experience as part of their TVS, but many of the staff we spoke to felt that the balance was not yet correct.

155. One recurring TfOC theme is specifically related to the use by On Call staff. On Call retained staff are allocated between two-to-three hours per week for a training night and two-to-three hours per month for On Call volunteers. This normally also includes the need to conduct equipment and safety checks as well as routine administration. It was reported that many of the packages were still far too comprehensive to be delivered and understood within a single training night and inhibited practical training. It was described that some, for example General Data Protection Regulation, could take up to three or four training nights to finish, which was a significant portion of training time in the year.

156. This issue was highlighted in our report of 2020^[31] where we detailed that ‘there is excessive theory content in TfOC modules. The time required to deliver the depth of content, and to complete online assessments and update training records, left staff with very little time to conduct practical training, a concern that was consistently raised across the Service’. The impact could also be exacerbated by limited access to the training and information and communication technology systems at station level as well as operational turnouts during the training night.

157. The Service detailed that this issue will always be a challenge where compliance related modules are concerned and the content is mandated and inflexible. The training function itself has limited input regarding the content of such modules as they are designed and populated by the relevant Function and would fall beyond the scope of OT. They report that there has been continuous development to streamline training modules without sacrificing rigour or impacting firefighter safety.

158. Another recurring theme is that some TfOC modules do not reflect the actual risks faced by remote rural On Call stations, particularly those on islands, such as training for railway incidents where no railways exist. Despite this, staff still feel pressured to ‘turn modules green’ for compliance, even when the training is irrelevant to them. This has led to frustration and reduced confidence in the credibility of the system. The Service noted that when the TfOC packages for each quarter are issued, stations can request elements of training to be removed, but this is rarely requested. We understand that work has commenced to review training packages for On Call stations with a dedicated manager within the LED team tasked with this work package.

159. We found that the model for ‘what’ training is being delivered and maintained provides clear structures and improvements in the design and delivery of OT, particularly the modernised and streamlined TfOC programme. However, it also surfaces cultural and practical challenges, especially the perception that digital learning is overpowering practical skills development and a misalignment between the TfOC design and the realities of the On Call duty system. These tensions point to a need for further refinement to ensure training remains practical, accessible and role-appropriate. But also, the need for the training function to engage with SD staff to explain the benefits of blended learning better.

Area for Consideration 7: The training function should continue to review training for operational competence content to ensure that it is fit for purpose and in particular that it is appropriate for staff constrained by the terms and conditions and duty pattern of being retained or volunteer On Call.

160. As detailed in Table 8 below, for core skill acquisition and firefighter development, training is delivered by training instructors, with station-based supervisory managers sharing responsibility for workplace development. Both groups also support ongoing core skills maintenance. The TFF emphasises that supervisory managers must manage staff competencies and provide regular training. Specialist skill acquisition and refresher training are delivered by training instructors, qualified supervisory managers, or external providers. As noted earlier, the training function aims to deliver training locally while coordinating it nationally.

Table 8 - Designated role for delivery of training

161. The majority of on-station training is delivered by watch supervisory managers, as outlined in their role map. They are supported by training SD support instructors and On Call Support WCs, who provide essential assistance to station-based personnel. It is recognised that both the SD support instructors and On Call Support WC’s fulfil an essential role and provide invaluable support to station-based staff. However, to deliver this model effectively, supervisory managers must have the skills, knowledge, competencies and be confident as well as credible in their role. Significant WT staff attrition in recent years, due mainly to pension remedy retirements, has increased the need to develop newly promoted supervisory managers so they can meet these expectations.

162. Historically and in a more stable condition, supervisory managers may be developed with courses such as, methods of instruction training, instructor qualifications in RTC and/or BA as well as other managerial skills. In addition, the Service has historically utilised unofficial mentoring and coaching as a development tool, which can be highly effective when used correctly. We understand that the process of providing instructor qualifications to newly promoted staff has been limited due to historic training strategy and that levels have reduced significantly over a long period of time.

163. Throughout our inspection we were presented with frustration and concern from staff that the current cadre of supervisory managers have not been upskilled and developed sufficiently and the organisation has failed to react to this risk appropriately. In addition, the high turnover of staff has diminished the ability of the organisation to rely on mentoring and coaching, as many experienced staff have left the organisation in a short period of time. Also, there was a feeling from middle managers that the training culture on stations was not as effective as it could be and that there was an over reliance and expectation on the training function for the delivery of training. Some of these issues have been recognised by the training function and we are aware that they have implemented a process to reestablish instructor qualification levels and improve instructor revalidation procedures within station-based supervisory management.

164. In addition to on-station supervisory managers, training instructors have a significant role to play in the effective and efficient delivery of training. As detailed, there would seem to be a high vacancy rate within training, which is predominantly driven by unfilled posts at area, core and driving instructor level. The current data would suggest that the highest vacancy rate is in the NSDA with the WSDA also being affected. We found that the position detailed above mirrored our feedback and that we encountered the highest levels of frustration regarding capacity in these areas.

165. This vacancy issue appeared to be impacting on the ability to deliver courses as programmed, which has led to the cancellation of some courses, sometimes at late notice. The instructor shortage also often results in members of other training teams being used to supplement the gaps, which consequently impacts other areas of training delivery. Many staff within the training function, detailed that vacancies were a routine issue and had a negative impact on workload and the subsequent delivery of training.

166. The vacancy rate within the instructor cadre was a continued point of discussion throughout our inspections. The attraction and retention of staff would seem to be a constant source of frustration for management, particularly for remote and rural areas. T&Cs seemed to be a barrier with weekend working, workload, renumeration, requirement to travel nationally all being negative examples cited. In addition, the T&Cs also seemed to inhibit the effectiveness of functional management as they do not align with many of the course start and finish times, which ultimately impacts on overall capacity.

167. The vacancy rate also seemed to be exacerbated by the lack of a clear organisational career pathway with experienced and qualified staff reporting being encouraged to leave the training function for pre-promotion operational experience in the absence of an organisational talent management process for managers and functions to follow. On a positive note, the training function have recognised some of these issues and developed staffing solutions to fill routine and/or hard to fill posts. The introduction of new roles within Western Isles, Orkney and Shetland is a good example of innovation to improve performance for an identified risk and more are required to deal with other issues.

168. As detailed, the training function introduced a new TVS. It was recognised that the requirements identified through the TVS and TFF could not be met with the existing instructor structure and capacity. To address this, the Service restructured training into a single training function by merging all local SDA training staff with the national instructor pool as detailed previously. This transition was completed in April 2024. However, some SDA staff remain concerned about the loss of local control, are sceptical that the changes will improve long term local performance and perceive the shift as further centralisation that reduces local flexibility and autonomy.

169. This issue was exemplified by the redeployment of a training SC based in the NSDA who had SD liaison as their functional responsibility. The unintended consequence of this has been a loss of a dedicated role to consider SDA training issues that are identified and the subsequent administrative capacity to deal with them. As we understand it, a SD SC now has responsibility for this role alongside their other duties and examples like these continue to feed improvement scepticism.

170. Whilst SD staff view the introduction of the TVS as not being wholly positive, the training function believes that the consolidation of the instructional staff has been beneficial as it has led to more efficient use of the instructional staff capacity. The strategy is a clear and innovative attempt from the training function to start to address many of the historic training issues and they should be commended for its development. However, it would seem that there is still a need to continually review the impact of the changes to ensure continued SD engagement.

171. Fire Ground Technicians (FGTs) provide essential logistical support at TCs, preparing drill yards and facilities for daily courses. Team sizes range from one to five depending on location. Despite working with basic Microsoft-based systems and physical props, FGTs were consistently enthusiastic, organised and solutions focused. Their main frustrations related to limited capacity and frequent challenges with equipment, appliances and facilities. Daily routines were not well documented, with tasks often learned informally from colleagues, creating a risk of knowledge loss, particularly for smaller teams.

172. Training support for On Call stations is delivered by the training function through scheduled instructor visits. However, staff reported wide variation in how often these visits occur, some stations receive consistent monthly or quarterly support, while others have gone many months without a visit. We were also told that former structured support schedules have largely lapsed, with visits now often arranged on an ad hoc basis. Overall, the approach appeared inconsistent, varying across LSO areas and SDAs.

173. Managers acknowledged that past visit arrangements lacked structure and that improved planning is needed to fully support the TfOC. They felt the current Service-wide approach is inconsistent and that good practice is not routinely shared. A new initiative in one area introduced a tiered support model, ensuring every On Call station receives at least one scheduled instructor visit per quarter as a minimum. It is understood that this practice is now being adopted across the function.

174. The frequency of visits varied, based on local management factors, including the number of WT staff dual contracting at each station. Where less support was needed, visit frequency was reduced. Despite some challenges, this new approach would seem to enable a more consistent, measurable level of support across the Service. The introduction of On Call support WCs in recent years has also strengthened training delivery, particularly in remote rural areas. We have observed that their contribution is viewed as a positive and effective enhancement to On Call training support.

175. We noted ongoing difficulties attracting and retaining support staff instructors within DT, where vacancy levels remain high. Challenges include T&Cs and the inability to offer salaries competitive with the external market. Although the current DT model relies mainly on internal delivery and this approach is valued by many staff, concerns were repeatedly raised that it is unsustainable. Staff believe the model may be unable to meet future demand, especially given anticipated legislative changes. The Service is aware of these issues and is actively reviewing the DT model, which will be discussed later in the report.

176. In summary, the roles and responsibilities for ‘who’ is delivering and maintaining training are clearly defined, but a persistent vacancy gap is limiting delivery. The limited development of station-based supervisory managers may be affecting training quality, although efforts are under way to upskill them with technical qualifications. Attraction and retention issues within the instructor cadre are further constraining capacity. To alleviate these pressures, the training function has introduced innovative solutions, such as new roles in hard to fill areas, a more consistent On Call support model and changes introduced through the TVS that demonstrate a continued commitment to improvement.

Area for Consideration 8: It is clear that capacity will continue to be an issue for the training function moving forward. The training function should consider accelerating the drive to up skill station-based watch commanders and linked training processes as this will hopefully spread the burden wider and release more functional capacity.

177. The Service maintains an operational TOM with defined skills required to ensure safe and effective teams. The TNA supports this by identifying skill requirements in partnership with workforce planning. To achieve and maintain competence, the training function must deliver both acquisition training for new skills and ongoing maintenance/refresher training for existing skills. This requires an appropriate balance between training volume (quantity) and training effectiveness (quality) to ensure both compliance and competence are achieved.

178. From an acquisition perspective, training ranges from lower-risk skills such as knot tying to high-risk, complex skills including BA, ERD, rope rescue and water rescue. Course duration varies from a few days to several months or years. Acquisition training is usually delivered and assessed internally by qualified instructors. Staff generally viewed these courses positively, reporting good learning experiences and strong competence outcomes, reflected in consistently high ‘KPI 29’ satisfaction scores. Most concerns focused not on quality, but on volume, highlighting continuing capacity pressures.

179. The approach to maintenance and refresher training differs from acquisition training. TfOC is the primary system for recording the maintenance of core and advanced skills. As detailed core modules run on a 12-month cycle and advanced modules on a 36-month cycle, delivered through LCMS with completion monitored via established governance processes. Staff must complete each module and assessment to ‘tick it green’, which then demonstrates maintenance of competence and generates performance data. Feedback on TfOC was mixed: while staff welcomed recent improvements and updated content, concerns remained about the system’s effectiveness.

180. Many staff reported that the system promotes a ‘tick box’ culture, with completion focused more on compliance than genuinely maintaining competence. The training function detail that there is consistent messaging that the focus should be on competence. TfOC attainment for core, advanced and FDO modules currently sits at 74%, 81% and 84% respectively, well below the 95% target and showing a downward trend. Limited auditing and low levels of exercising further hinder the Service’s ability to accurately assess competence once initial skills have been acquired.

181. Many operational skills require renewal every three-to-five years, with refresher training and assessments forming a significant organisational workload. Although mainly shorter than acquisition courses, refreshers still consume substantial capacity. Current attainment rates for core, advanced and IC refresher courses are 82%, 111% and 96% respectively, against targets of 73%, 90% and 91%. The overall upward trend indicates increasing delivery. Refresher training is mainly delivered face to face by qualified internal instructors, with some external support. Staff generally viewed these courses positively and raised no major concerns about quality or standards, reflected in the consistently high ‘KPI 29’ satisfaction scores.

182. Some refresher course concerns focused on currency lapses, compliance-driven processes and limited use of practical application evidence. Staff reported frequent issues with ICs, ERD drivers and instructors falling out of competence currency due to a cumbersome monitoring system and the significant impact of missing deadlines. Many felt refresher training emphasised compliance over genuine skills updating, with BA and IC training noted in particular. Given the large number of BA wearers and ICs, this may reflect the perception of a system geared toward throughput, where quantity can overshadow quality. The Service did provide evidence of proactive benchmarking processes designed to encourage that quality is a factor constantly being considered in delivery.

183. Many staff were frustrated that practical evidence from incidents or exercises could not be used to maintain or extend competence currency. Although the current system ensures compliance, it generates high training volumes, creating pressure on capacity and giving the impression that quantity outweighs quality. It also fails to recognise the skills of experienced staff who could reduce this burden if operational evidence were accepted. Notwithstanding, the Service have reported that current guidance, resourcing, systems etc. impact viability and it is acknowledged that the practicality of achieving this for some skills would be challenging.

184. Overall, the competence model is heavily compliance-driven, inefficient, and takes limited account of strong evidence gained through real incident attendance or on-station training. The system delivers acquisition training effectively, but maintenance and refresher training are strained by limited capacity, a perceived compliance-driven approach and the inability to use operational evidence to demonstrate ongoing competence. We believe this creates inefficiency, frustrates staff and misses opportunities to adopt a more modern, flexible, risk-based model.

Area for Consideration 9: The training function should consider how it utilises other sources of evidence to prove competence, which would hopefully encourage a better balance to the perceived culture of compliance over competence.

185. The TVS and TFF place an importance on practical training and state that training will use a blended model combining face to face, on the job, digital and virtual reality methods. We observed most of these elements in use, though virtual reality is still developing. Staff generally felt the blend was appropriate, though some expressed concern about an increasing shift toward digital learning due to its flexibility and efficiency. While digital methods offer clear benefits, physical training remains vital for interaction, feedback, teamwork and practical skills, all essential in a technical, hands-on organisation. We found no major issues with the current balance but note the need for the Service to remain alert to maintaining an appropriate mix.

186. Training is essential for safety in the fire service but must be balanced against the need to provide a continuous 24/7 operational response. Removing staff from the operational TOM requires careful planning, whether for short or long-term training. Training may occur while personnel remain available for deployment, under strategic reserve with limited availability, or Off The Run (OTR) with no operational commitment for the duration of the training.

187. Most station-based training is carried out while staff remain available for operational deployment and is usually completed efficiently with only occasional disruption. Staff may use strategic reserve to attend off-station or site-specific training when required. Station management teams and OC organise most on-station, off-station and site-specific training. In the WSDA, up to six appliances can be placed on strategic reserve during day shifts and up to nine at night. In the East and North SDAs, arrangements are less formal, and although appliances can be placed on reserve, the likelihood of recall to operational duties was reported as higher, resulting in inconsistency across the Service.

188. We found that use of the strategic reserve has declined, with SD managers increasingly struggling to secure authorisation from OC. SD staff expressed frustration at reduced opportunities to train and maintain competence, particularly in complex specialist skills. Training, OC and SD personnel all reported that withdrawing staff from operational cover is a persistent and growing barrier to training. Staff reported that some of these aspects may point to a potential cultural issue, rather than any specific strategic guidance, in that training may not hold the correct value when compared against prevention and protection activities, station routines or rest periods.

189. Training teams acknowledged these challenges and are seeking to standardise the approach. We were also advised that CS and operations function have agreed revised crewing and buffering rules, though it is unclear whether this has yet resulted in meaningful improvements.

Area for Consideration 10: The Service should review arrangements for appliance strategic reserve to provide a consistent system allowing staff to maximise training, balanced with operational commitments.

190. Training at training facilities or external providers normally requires taking either whole crews or individuals OTR, coordinated through CS. The TNA informs scheduling, with Team C populating the training planner and liaising with customers to nominate appliances or students. CS, OC and station managers then arrange any required moves to ensure operational cover. The training team use the scheduler to assign instructors, resources, equipment and welfare provision. Course directors receive attendance lists and are responsible for preparing course materials and briefing instructors before delivery.

191. This is a somewhat simplified summary of the process and we are aware that there are many moving parts that require management. It would appear that the training function utilise systems such as LCMS, pdrPro and Microsoft packages to manage training, whilst the People Directorate use a software package called iTrent. The iTrent system among other functions, stores personal records including qualifications, skills and competencies. Station management teams have limited access to iTrent reports and the training systems, relying mainly on engagement with the directorates for up-to-date information or their own manual records kept at station level. It was reported that the use of available iTrent reports can be limited by the restricted awareness of SD management teams.

192. It is understood there is a heavy reliance on individuals at stations monitoring their own competence currency and indicating the need for further training or assessment. It is therefore conceivable, due to the numerous moving parts, that there may be occasions where communication and administration fail to identify a training need with a subsequent negative impact on SD.

193. This situation aligns with the accounts provided to us of ICs, ERDs and instructors dropping out of competence currency. The resultant impact being that the skill becomes unavailable for operational deployment and there may be a necessity for the individual to complete training again, which is an inefficient and ineffective use of capacity. It is understood that the training function are in the process of scoping and procuring a new training software system that will streamline many of the issues discussed above and it is hoped that it should also encapsulate the management of skills, qualifications and competencies to allow for improved training planning.

194. To deliver the TVS there is an organisational capacity required. We believe that there is a need for capacity to release people from their operational commitment for training. The capacity of instructors to deliver the training and capacity of personnel to maintain their competence are also factors that require consideration. We understand that the Service has an operational TOM and commensurate duty systems that are designed to provide a continuous operational response to an agreed standard and skill set. In recent years, the maintenance of this provision has been under increasing pressure due to budgetary constraints within public services. We have observed that the training function, as a supplier, and the SDAs as customers are both finding it increasingly difficult to release staff for training whether that be OTR or on strategic reserve.

195. Additionally, we have already identified that training has a TOM, which is designed to provide the capacity for expected training and future workstreams and emerging issues. This capacity is under pressure as the vacancy rate, particularly within the instructor roles, may be having a negative effect on delivery. This is allied to the Service’s own analysis of capacity where they detail that many of the training teams were working way over 100% to deliver against the organisational need.

196. Staff consistently reported struggling to maintain their CPD, prepare or debrief courses, review materials, or proactively improve training. Many also found it difficult to take leave or time off in lieu. As detailed, the training function recognises these issues and believes an additional 18 to 20 instructors are needed to meet demand and future workstreams. While we cannot confirm the accuracy of this figure without deeper analysis, it is clear the training function requires staffing to its agreed TOM, and that any new organisational capacity should be prioritised for improved training delivery, but also to review and develop training in line with the principles of continuous improvement.

197. We visited several stations with additional specialisms, such as rope rescue, water rescue and heavy rescue, which required a commitment to additional training and maintenance of skills. Most crews viewed the extra training positively, with minimal impact reported. The training function highlighted its recommendation to expand the use of Knowledge Applied Training and Assessment (KATA) sessions across Height, Water and Urban Search and Rescue capabilities. These sessions provide risk-based, scenario driven, refresher and maintenance training, helping crews sustain competence through realistic, applied learning.

198. Their hope is that it has improved training efficiency by reducing duplication, strengthened assurance through structured Subject Matter Expert oversight, and delivered measurable improvements in operational readiness and safety. KATA is now embedded as business-as-usual within specialist rescue team, supported by robust quality assurance processes and recorded outcomes in pdrPro. We found that where these sessions had been delivered, they were well received with staff reporting positive learning experience. That said, not all staff were aware of the concept and we remained unconvinced that the process had been fully rolled out.

Good Practice 4

The development of the knowledge applied training and assessment system would seem to be a positive innovation and is going some way to filling a potential gap in training delivery. The innovation should be commended and applied consistently to all areas of the Service.

199. Where some remote WT stations (such as Inverness, Elgin, Oban and Dumfries) have been allocated multiple specialisms, staff reported increasing difficulty maintaining these skills. We were told that higher station workloads, competing training demands and limited access to strategic reserve make regular, high-quality off-station training challenging. While we cannot fully triangulate these concerns, we remain unconvinced that the current training regime provides sufficient assurance in the operational competence expected of these personnel. We could find no evidence to demonstrate that the Service analyses the impact of the applied SD model for a station, balanced against the expectations of training and other workload.

200. In summary, we found that the current model for delivering training is under significant strain due to structural and capacity challenges, competence risks, operational pressures and local inconsistencies. While the strategic intent is clear and improvements are underway, the model is still struggling to meet organisational needs, creating a real risk to maintaining competence and operational resilience.

201. The training function envisage that training will be conducted on-station, off-station, at TCs or at site-specific locations for skills such as rope rescue or water rescue etc. The Training Strategic Asset Management Plan (TSAMP) has been developed in conjunction with members of the training and asset function to establish and maintain a sustainable training asset portfolio. It is the intention to look more fully at the TSAMP later in this report and as such, commentary on aspects of building infrastructure, vehicles and equipment will be reserved at this point.

202. On-station training is the most common method of delivery. LCMS and TfOC materials are accessible via the Service intranet and stations are equipped with varying degrees of equipment such as smart boards, projectors, computers or laptops. Recently renovated stations generally reported good working environments and adequate IT provision. However, many stations, particularly On Call, consistently raised concerns about poor internet connectivity and limited computer access. On Call staff felt these issues hindered effective learning, often completing modules at home instead. This is especially problematic given the Service’s reliance on blended learning, digital content, and the need for supervised, team-based training.

203. In general, drill yards, towers and equipment allowed effective on-station practical training. However, some towers were unusable due to a range of known safety concerns, and some yards were too restricted because of station layout or nearby buildings. At certain stations, limited space and ageing infrastructure also made training difficult in poor weather, alongside issues with dignified facilities (DF), welfare provision and contamination control (ConC). These challenges are known to the Service and documented within the TSAMP, with investment prioritised accordingly.

204. We found that site-specific locations were effectively used for specialist training such as rope rescue and water rescue. These sites were properly identified and risk assessed and staff were generally positive about their use, albeit some training had been restricted for resource, safety and finance issues. Increasing restrictions on gaining OTR or strategic reserve status frequently led to sessions being interrupted, postponed or cancelled at short notice, which negatively affected development, motivation and morale.

205. We also found limited evidence of stations designing and delivering off-site routine training. This is consistent with the findings of previous HMFSI reports. Historically this type of training was routine, but its use would seem to have declined. Staff attributed this to a lack of confidence in completing planning, risk assessments and approvals, as well as perceived bureaucracy. It is also possible that the current SD model and restrictions on accessing strategic reserve status further inhibit this type of activity. Where it did occur, it was well received and increased enthusiasm due to its variety and realism.

206. For the training function to achieve its overall objective to develop and deliver high-quality training they believe it is essential to provide fit for purpose national training facilities. We observed and were informed of a variety of functional issues at each site, both positive and negative. It is the intention to explore these in more detail later in the report as detailed previously. Currently, the SFRS has 13 training locations:

Dreghorn (WSDA);
Dumfries (WSDA);
NTC, Cambuslang (WSDA);
Dundee Airport (NSDA);
Invergordon (NSDA);
Inverness (NSDA);
Kirkwall (NSDA);
Oban (NSDA);
Perth (NSDA);
Portlethen (NSDA);
Stornoway (NSDA);
Sumburgh (NSDA); and
Newbridge (ESDA).

207. Much of the maintenance training, such as casualty care, hazmat, knots and lines, RTC extrication, water awareness, safe working at height, IC, driving and trainee phases is delivered on-station. However, some training requires attendance at TCs, including Recruit training, BA refresher, CFBT, tactical ventilation, IC and DT courses etc. Although TCs are primarily reserved for scheduled courses, they are available for operational crews to book. We found little evidence of local crews using these facilities. It is unclear whether this is due to limited development opportunities, perceived bureaucracy, or restrictions linked to the current SD model and strategic reserve requirements.

208. We visited most training facilities during this and previous inspections. While all were in use, the NTC, Portlethen, Newbridge, Perth and Invergordon operated as the primary hubs. Staff were generally content to attend these centres and, although they preferred local access, they routinely travelled to other sites when required. The training function appeared to use all locations where practical to balance local delivery with national coordination. Functional and SD staff recognised that not every course could be delivered at every venue and accepted the need for flexibility. Although there were occasional instances of excessive travel or last-minute cancellations, these were infrequent and did not raise significant concern.

209. Following SFRS reform, several training sites in the ESDA were closed, leaving Newbridge as the only dedicated TC for that area. Although significant investment has been made at Newbridge, staff noted that its location and restrictive transport links make access difficult for some remoter stations. While flexible use of other sites, such as the NTC, Perth, Dundee and Dumfries, helps meet demand, this arrangement highlights a possible under provision of training facilities within the ESDA, potentially on the east side of the City of Edinburgh or the Scottish Borders.

Area for Consideration 11: There would seem to be a potential gap of facility provision within the ESDA, which may be affecting efficient delivery of training. The Service should continue to review service delivery across its training estate and considering enhancing provision should resourcing and finance permit.

210. Staff reported historic concerns about a punitive assessment culture at some venues, which created anxiety and discouraged learning. Most staff interviewed now feel the environment has improved and assessments are less intimidating. We are pleased to hear that cultural change has occurred, however inconsistencies in training delivery between venues remain a common frustration. These differences undermine confidence in the process, and there is a clear need for the training function to strengthen and maintain standardisation across all TCs.

211. The directorate can use external providers when additional expertise, capacity or specialist skills are required. Although external provision can offer greater cost effectiveness, efficiency and flexibility, use of this model remains limited. Some staff have attended specialist RTC, water and rope rescue courses externally. However, several managers felt the Service has not fully explored external options that could better meet operational needs and reduce pressure on internal resources and capacity.

212. This issue was particularly evident in the DT model, where relying solely on internal instructors and assessors was not meeting the required number of qualified drivers. While the Driver Training Centre teams themselves were highly regarded, staff expressed frustration with a model that no longer appeared effective. Many believed that a blended approach, including the use of external providers, would deliver better results and improve SD outcomes. Directorate management confirmed that significant work has been undertaken to review DT arrangements, maximise capacity and make use of limited outsourcing. They detailed that they have previously piloted the outsourcing of DT which proved to be challenging in terms of delivery. Following that a procurement process was conducted to identify an external provider to deliver DT, this process was unsuccessful as no viable supplier could meet all requirements in terms of time, quality and cost.

213. In summary, the model for ‘where’ training is delivered works in principle, but its effectiveness is undermined by practical issues. Persistent information and communication technology problems, limited access to strategic reserve, under provision of facilities in some regions, inconsistent use of TCs, and significant standardisation gaps, all restrict delivery. Although staff value recent improvements, they remain constrained by infrastructure limitations, access challenges and inconsistent practices across the Service.

Recommendation 4

It is understood that the training function is moving towards a more blended approach for training with increasing reliance on digital applications. We would recommend that the Service review the information and communication technology infrastructure available at station, particularly On Call to ensure that the model can be delivered in the way it is envisaged.

OT – Skills In Focus

214. The Service trains for a wide range of operational skills, which are too many to mention in this report. However, there are a number of skills that we received consistent feedback on and feel that it is necessary to report some of these in more detail.

Trainees

215. WT trainees complete a 16-week course at a SFRS TC. High trainee numbers have required more flexible delivery models, including switching some cohorts to a ‘four on/four off’ duty pattern instead of the standard five-day week. These adjustments, combined with increased demand, have created capacity and scheduling pressures, particularly at the NTC where most training occurs. Staff delivering the programme were consistently engaged, knowledgeable and enthusiastic, though the sustained workload has had a noticeable impact on them.

216. Following graduation, trainees enter the Red, Amber and Green development phases, each concluding with practical exercises and formal assessment. Successful completion of the green phase assessment and verified portfolio allowed trainees to be designated as competent firefighters. However, as noted in SDA reports, some trainees who completed their development plans experienced delays in being signed off due to a shortage of assessors and verifiers nationally. A recent His Majesty’s Inspector of Education audit of the MA/SVQ process resulted in several recommendations being progressed by the People Directorate. While many of the underlying issues have been addressed, the impact is still being felt to a degree by trainees and the watch officers responsible for supporting them. This matter is discussed later in the report.

217. There was also consistent feedback from supervisory managers that trainees arriving on station did not exhibit a level of competence in skills that they considered the most important. Examples given, were lack of consistency from instructors, too much emphasis on community safety and not enough emphasis on basic skills such as casualty care, RTC and BA. Some examples provided indicated frustration of students that they had not been given the opportunity to extinguish a live fire at any point in their training course.

218. The Service reported that this particular issue was addressed in the first priority phase of the BA recovery plan and that the trainee foundation course is under continual review, with reduced community safety content and increased focus on core operational skills, including BA. Ongoing debriefing has led to improvements, including an additional week to strengthen BA and casualty care training. A longer BA phase is currently being piloted and will be evaluated soon. The training function stated that graduation from the trainee foundation course is a ‘false horizon’, where only minimum safe levels of competence have been achieved in order to form part of an operational crew. The majority of development towards full competence should occur during the 33 month development phase on-station. Despite this belief and the ongoing changes to the course, there remains a clear disconnect between the level of competence expected by stations and what the Service believes the course should deliver.

219. On Call firefighters have an agreed modular development pathway, incorporating a two-week Task and Task Management course followed by two weeks of BA training, as well as other training such a casualty care, RTC, water rescue and safe working at heights. This initial training can be a barrier, as it often affects their primary employment and/or annual leave. The Service is working to improve recruitment and initial training through its national On Call improvement programme. We understand that some On Call training is being delivered in modular format over weekends, thus taking pressure off of trainees in relation to their primary employment. Those who attended weekend modules reported positive experiences. The Service should continue to prioritise and expand this approach.

Good Practice 5

It is pleasing to note that the training function are developing innovative solutions to course delivery, which will allow a more flexible approach for On Call course attendance. The development should be commended and used as a future model for improvement.

BA

220. Trainees have historically been given an initial two-week course in BA, with the skill then further developed throughout the phases of reaching competence. All other staff maintain their BA competence with incident attendance, on-station training and refresher training and assessment. Historically, BA wearers were given BA, Tactical Ventilation and CFBT refresher training on a three-yearly cycle. However, following the post Covid19 period, where much of the training was suspended for a period, the Service required to develop and instigate a BA recovery plan which incorporated all three disciplines into one day. It is important to recognise now, the unique circumstances that led to this problem in the first place and the excellent efforts of those concerned in addressing the shortfall and resetting the foundation on which to build.

221. It should also be acknowledged that the development and delivery of the plan has required significant functional capacity. The new ‘three in one’ course enabled the Service to train and assess large numbers of BA wearers more quickly and to reset at an agreed baseline following the disruption of Covid19. Although the recovery plan has delivered positive results, it has now been extended twice and continues to place substantial demands on the training function. The plan’s main outcomes are widely reported across the SFRS and therefore are subject to extensive scrutiny.

222. Staff expressed mixed views about the three-in-one BA course. Many recognised its importance in demonstrating BA competence and reported positive experiences at TCs. However, they also felt the previous system, where BA, CFBT and Tactical Ventilation were taught separately, provided more focused learning. This reflected wider and previous concerns about compliance taking precedence over competence, and quantity over quality. Staff also questioned the significant functional capacity required for the BA recovery plan, noting its impact on other training areas. Overall, they felt a balanced model between the old and current approach would be more effective. The Service acknowledges these issues and intends to review the BA refresher course prior to the recovery plan concluding. It reported that the next iteration of BA training being developed would reflect current guidance, benchmarking, best practice and should negate concerns regarding compliance and quantity.

Good Practice 6

The Service has ploughed considerable resources into the breathing apparatus recovery plan, probably at the expense and prioritisation of other training projects. Although there is a degree of criticism surrounding elements of the plan it should be recognised for providing a high level of comfort that most staff have been assessed to an agreed standard over a relatively short period of time. Those staff involved should be commended for the excellent work which brought about the course development and delivery.

223. Other commonly reported BA training issues included limited practice in natural offensive ventilation, training temperatures that were too low, and insufficient opportunities for controlled fire extinguishing. While some limitations stem from Service policy and contemporary guidance, many staff still felt the refresher training did not adequately prepare them for critical operational tasks. This reflects long-standing concerns, with previous inspections also noting frustration at the lack of realistic hot wear BA training.

224. Staff reported that BA training had become overly assessment-driven, creating a negative learning environment. An example of this focused on the Service’s strict assessment of BA entry control. Although understood to be absolutely critical, the perceived aggressive nature of the assessment process contributed to staff discomfort, particularly among On Call staff who worried that failing refreshers may have a negative impact on fire cover for their community. Although many noted that the overly forceful assessment culture was historic and has eased considerably, some staff still remain wary of attending TC courses. It should be noted that some staff also reported that the training culture has shifted positively from being assessment-focused to offering a more supportive learning experience. While maintaining high standards is essential, especially for BA, there is a risk that the approach becomes counterproductive if it undermines confidence and learning.

225. Historically, there was a practice whereby many supervisory managers routinely held the BA instructor qualification, enabling them to train and assess BA skills at station level. Since the SFRS’s inception, both the qualification and its practical use have declined. The training function have now reinstated BA instructor training for supervisory officers, which is a positive step. This will strengthen the supervisory development pathway and increase training capacity. It is important that future processes make full use of qualified BA instructor staff to share the training workload and support the wider training function.

226. From 2022-2025, 72% of operational staff completed the BA TfOC module, while 82% received BA refresher training. For WT staff, TfOC completion was 83% and refresher completion 85%. For On Call staff, TfOC completion fell to 65%, with 81% completing refresher training. These figures show BA competence and refresher activity are being delivered, but TfOC attainment remains well below the 95% target—particularly for On Call staff. Refresher attainment exceeds the 73% target, reflecting the positive impact of the recovery plan.

227. Whilst the recovery plan is ensuring all staff receive the three-in-one course promptly, it remains concerning that TfOC completion levels, particularly for On Call staff are still low. Although several factors may influence these results, the consistently poor attainment represents an ongoing organisational risk and this performance should be improved

Driver Training

228. The ability to drive safely under blue light conditions is essential for effective operational response. To maintain this capability, the Service relies on a cadre of uniformed and support staff within DT to deliver and assess ERD skills. However, a 23% vacancy rate in support roles and an overall 18% vacancy rate in DT means the Service barely runs enough courses to keep up with Service need.

229. The SFRS has aligned its driver training to the NFCC Driver Training Framework in preparation for Road Safety Act 2006 Section 19 implementation. A key risk has been identified regarding Approved Driving Instructor (ADI) qualifications. The NFCC guidance requires existing ADI qualified staff to complete ‘Train the Trainer’ courses to develop new instructors and holding an ADI licence as a mandatory prerequisite. The Service currently has only four ADI qualified instructors, and there is no contractual requirement or incentive for staff to retain this qualification or undertake the necessary training.

230. We were made aware of these two perceived risks to the Service regarding DT standard changes in the future. It is envisaged that changes to standards and courses may need to be instigated due to the adoption of NFCC and Road Safety Act 2006 Section 19 requirements. The changes are much more onerous and could negatively impact capacity and resilience of both the training function and organisation as well as potential changes to instructor T&Cs. Many staff raised their concern regarding these issues and the ability of the training function to maintain an acceptable level of service delivery when implemented. In mitigation, the Service reported being very engaged in the statutory consultation process as well as detailing that changes to business process and mapping in preparation of Section 19 challenges was well advanced.

231. Attracting and retaining both uniformed and support staff in DT continues to be challenging. While staff are recruited internally, many have not progressed to instructor level or leave the training function before they have attained any qualification. Support staff recruitment is also difficult, as current T&Cs are less competitive in the wider market, resulting in the very few ADI qualified instructors. That said, it is understood that a job evaluation process has resulted in upgrading of the posts which may assist in future recruitment campaigns. Although the Service has explored alternative delivery models and used external providers, this has not significantly increased capacity as yet. Efforts such as contract variations and market rate allowances are ongoing, but maintaining the TOM remains difficult.

232. The process for qualifying to drive a fire appliance under blue light conditions involves several stages: obtaining a provisional Large Goods Vehicle Category C (Cat C) licence, completing a General Practitioner medical, passing the theory test, completing the Cat C course, an extended period of familiarisation driving and finally passing the Cat C ERD course. Reported timescales range from 9 to 18 months, averaging around 12. The linear nature of the process means each stage is vulnerable to delays or failure and requires constant oversight by training and local SD managers. FDOs must also complete a Category B ERD course before responding under blue light conditions in service vehicles. The Service has struggled to maintain this qualification for newly promoted officers, resulting in some being restricted to normal road speeds, which reduces effectiveness and supervision at more complex incidents.

233. The SFRS staffing model is that two drivers are assigned to each watch per appliance and a further one additional for the station. If there are specialist appliances at the station, then that appliance should have a further two drivers. For an On Call station, 60% of the personnel should be qualified as drivers, which can be flexible depending on contract levels at each station. The qualification of driving has historically been a contentious issue as, although it sits within a firefighter’s role map, the option has been to seek volunteers rather than to compel. In more recent years, firefighters’ entering their amber phase of competence have been encouraged to enter the driver pathway, which has delivered a degree of success.

234. Many stations do not meet the required provision and continue to experience significant driver shortages. Previous reports highlighted limited resilience across all SDA areas, and a 2020 review identified a shortfall of 270 drivers within the WT duty system. Recent data shows staffing at only 82% of the TOM. Updated analysis, based on the requirement for two drivers assigned to each watch per appliance and 60% of On call personnel, indicates an overall shortfall of around 700 drivers (279 Wholetime and 426 On Call).

235. These figures exclude CCs and WCs who retain driving qualifications and who can provide support. For example, 291 WT CCs are eligible to drive, which would raise driving numbers above the TOM. Several On Call stations also remain significantly below their overall staffing TOM, which impacts the driver numbers. Overall, driver numbers have changed little over the past five years. While relying on supervisory managers to cover shortfalls is sometimes necessary, it is not sustainable for effective service delivery. On Call staffing shortages remain a persistent issue and affect more than just driver availability.

236. The training function has recently reviewed DT practices to maximise capacity, including limited outsourcing. The Service reports that ERD reassessment rates remain stable, though instructor shortages caused by resignations, promotions, and sickness continue to affect delivery. Pilot reassessment models have been introduced to free capacity for acquisition courses, and new timetables are in place. Recruitment efforts are ongoing, with additional instructors expected to support preparations for the increased demands associated with Section 19.

237. There remains a clear shortage of drivers, with many staff spending long periods assigned solely to driving duties. Some reported rarely performing non driving roles for months or even years. Driver shortages also affect leave, contribute to overtime fatigue, lead to unwanted transfers, and cause frequent detached duties. The issue of having to drive on your own personal licence with the risk of penalty if involved in an accident, would also seem to be a factor in low uptake levels. Low staffing levels have also resulted in firefighters’ being promoted into supervisory roles, further reducing driver resilience. These factors create a self-perpetuating cycle: fewer drivers increase reluctance to undertake the qualification, which in turn worsens the shortage. In our experience, the ‘driver issue’ remains one of the most significant factors negatively affecting morale at station level.

238. Driving safely under blue lights is a critical skill, and the training rightly prioritises competence and quality. However, the lengthy training process is slow to adapt to organisational changes. This is compounded by shortages of qualified drivers, limited instructor capacity and cultural barriers that reduce interest in the role. Upcoming changes to national driving standards are expected to increase the demands on training further. Many staff believe the current driver training and provision model is already under significant pressure and many view it as the most serious risk to operational delivery. The training function is aware of these issues, has begun adjusting course delivery and continues to review the delivery model.

239. From 2022-2025, 72% of operational staff completed the Driving TfOC module, while 82% undertook refresher training. Completion for Wholetime staff was higher (84% TfOC, 77% refresher) than for On Call staff (70% TfOC, 91% refresher). These figures show active engagement in driving competence training; however, TfOC attainment for both groups remains well below the 95% target, whereas refresher completion exceeds the 73% target.

240. Refresher training is performing well and consistently exceeds targets. However, TfOC completion rates remain low. While multiple factors may contribute, this shortfall continues to present a significant organisational risk and must be addressed. We found DT to be one of the most acute and systemic risks to SFRS operational effectiveness. A combination of instructor shortages, long qualification pathways, changing national standards, recruitment difficulties and cultural resistance means the Service is potentially facing a significant and growing shortfall in qualified drivers.

Recommendation 5

We found driver training to be one of the most concerning aspects of our operational training assessment and can understand the overwhelming sense of concern throughout the Service. We recommend that the Service review its driver training provision to enhance instructor capacity, improve training processes and increase driver levels.

Incident Command

241. IC training is delivered according to the level of incident a manager may be required to take charge of. All operational managers from PO to CC may act as Incident Commander depending on incident scale and type. Supervisory managers complete an Incident Command Assessment (ICA) or Incident Command Level 1 (ICL1); middle managers complete ICL2; strategic managers complete ICL3; and Heads of Function or Directors complete ICL4. The development and training pathway is detailed in Table 9 below.

Table 9 - IC levels and training pathway

242. Each course balances operational, tactical and strategic learning dependent on the role. ICA and ICL1 are typically delivered on mock firegrounds using live role players and scenario-based exercises. ICL2 to ICL4 are delivered in mock Incident Command Units using information and communication technology-based scenarios and live participants, reflecting the greater complexity of higher-level incidents.

243. Candidates are assessed against the appropriate National Occupational Standards with outcomes being either Satisfactory, Satisfactory Confirmation of Understanding or Major Development Needs identified. Acquisition courses are delivered on a WP basis with refresher courses routinely being delivered to ensure a three-year currency is maintained. In order to meet the National Occupational Standards candidates are taught principles of incident command and a systematic and structured process to work through, utilising tools and memory aides for assistance.

244. The IC team at the NTC is responsible for delivering and assessing IC training. Some instructors at other TCs also deliver ICA and ICL1 acquisition and refresher courses. The team is small in numbers and currently has one unfilled post. The team has reduced significantly in size since the SFRS was formed. Capacity has consistently been reported as a challenge.

245. Like their core instructor colleagues, the team focus heavily on delivering courses to meet organisational demand and at the time of our inspection were operating beyond capacity. This left little time for CPD, performance improvement, course review, or enhancing training materials and the learner experience. The TCIP recognises the need to allocate dedicated time and resources to review, expand and develop incident management training and assessment materials in line with the evolving role of a modern fire and rescue service, which we welcome.

246. We received positive feedback on ICL courses, particularly during acquisition training where new concepts were learned. However, many officers felt the courses focused too heavily on following a rigid process to pass the assessment, rather than developing adaptable operational command ability. Refresher courses were also criticised for functioning more as memory tests than opportunities to build competence, echoing findings from our 2020 Command and Control thematic inspection.

247. There was a perception, particularly around refreshers, that the process focused more on compliance than on developing competence. The Service has since introduced FDO CPD sessions, now part of routine IC business. The IC team has been tasked with regularly reviewing course content, speakers and scenarios, with new examples such as a high-rise incident in ICL1 and a storm/flooding case study in ICL3. FDO CPD events have also been delivered to all four command groups using virtual reality enabled online sessions, allowing officers across Scotland to take part in shared IC scenarios and support peer learning. These developments were well received and may help shift previous perceptions.

248. A process for assessing initial incident command competence, the On Station Assessment of Incident Command Competence (OSAICC) was reported during our fieldwork. Delivered through three online sessions followed by a practical scenario, OSAICC is now routinely used across SDAs for firefighter development. Although not formally part of the Incident Command Development pathway, it appears to be increasingly accepted as a method of incident command learning and assessment.

249. During Covid19, students could not attend courses in person, so remote virtual ICL courses were introduced. Some participants felt this reduced effectiveness due to limited personal interaction and peer-to-peer learning. Although accepted as a temporary measure, the digital format has remained in use until recently. Functional management have now indicated that remote ICL courses will be phased out. However, given the challenges of delivering training to commanders in remote rural locations, continued exploration of innovative digital solutions is to be encouraged.

250. It is noted that the Service trialled using the OA process to reaccredit IC currencies, aiming to ease training capacity pressures and use operational evidence as proof of competence. Following review, it was concluded that OA is not suitable for IC reaccreditation due to operational, governance and assurance concerns. The pilot was therefore closed, with assurance that existing reaccreditation processes remain sufficient and preserve the integrity of the IC qualification framework. While we accept the current OA limitations, we hope the concept will be revisited once improvements allow, as we believe evidence gained through operational activities has scope to provide an efficient and effective means of supplementing and demonstrating IC competence.

251. From 2022-2025, 77% of operational staff completed the IC TfOC module, while 95% completed refresher training. Among WT staff, TfOC completion was 82% and refresher completion 97%. For On Call staff, TfOC completion fell to 72%, with 95% completing refreshers. This shows IC competence training is being delivered, but TfOC attainment remains well below the 95% target, particularly for On Call staff, whereas refresher completion consistently exceeds the 91% target.

252. Although several factors may influence this, the continued shortfall represents a clear organisational risk and requires improvement. Overall, IC training is aligned with national standards and well structured. Delivery, however, is constrained by limited capacity, an assessment driven culture, and insufficient developmental focus. While initiatives such as OSAICC and some digital solutions show promise, the system remains overly compliance focused, restricting deeper learning and reducing confidence in the refresher processes.

Area for Consideration 12: There are significant concerns that incident command courses focus too heavily on passing assessments rather than developing real command capability. The training function should continue to review incident command training and assessment methods to ensure a better balance between demonstration of genuine competence and simple compliance.