Inspection of the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service North Service Delivery Area

91. The SFRS is taking steps to fully understand the condition of its operational stations in relation to the work that will be required to have them individually zoned and equipped to provide a suitable post incident decontamination environment. While this is welcome, there are significant challenges within the NSDA stations estate that will need to be overcome. Many stations within the SDA do not have the basic requirements of toilets or showers that are required to affect personnel decontamination processes. This issue and the scale of the challenge facing the Service is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the example of WIOS where, during a recent SFRS wide fire station survey, 25 of the 40 stations on the islands could not be properly designated for decontamination purposes. From these survey results it is clear that significant station infrastructure upgrades will be required across the NSDA to allow appropriate decontamination to be undertaken post operational incident.

92. During our fieldwork we visited Inverness Fire Station and were able to see what is possible in terms of integrating a decontamination strategy into a building’s infrastructure. The premises was set to undergo renovations and the plans, as we understand it were well advanced for the new layout, but did not include a focus on the infrastructure to support post incident decontamination. The LSO management team, in concert with the Fire Brigades Union (FBU), were able to achieve changes to the design specifications. What we viewed at Inverness was in short, a model for the future of firefighter decontamination.

93. The timing of the fire station renovation was perhaps fortunate, but without the foresight of the partnership approach between the LSO team and the FBU a valuable opportunity may have been lost. It is somewhat disappointing that before this partnership took a keen interest in the renovation works that decontamination infrastructure had not been considered a priority for the project. It is also worth noting that while significant levels of cash resource were directed towards this project, it offers insights into how, with relatively minor works such as strategically placed access points for showers, appropriate signage and access door furniture, that much can be achieved.

94.The station itself now has external BA cleaning stations, hanging racks for contaminated PPE, laundry bins In the outside area for bagged contaminated PPE, external doors to dedicated shower cubicles, dedicated locker space for all personnel (each with a grab bag for clean station wear kit placed within them), and dedicated exit points from the decontamination showering area back into the body of the station. This whole system works in a logical flow and signage indicating directions is prominently placed for easy viewing by personnel. These dedicated facilities are placed within a small station extension but could in our opinion be replicated within existing stations without recourse to wholesale rebuild works.

95. The new facilities and systems at Inverness have been well received by the operational staff who operate from there. They told us that they have made the cultural changes in attitude to decontamination that are required, as well as the supporting infrastructure, to make the system a success. The staff on site were well informed and engaged about the outcomes that the project set out to achieve. This can be summed up with the comment “the contaminants developments are really positive, and we feel positive about the set up”, demonstrating how staff have fully bought into the change. The SFRS formally reopened Dingwall Fire Station, which also has new decontamination infrastructure built into the station fabric, in November 2024.

Good Practice 5

The introduction of fire stations that have decontamination infrastructure fully integrated into their fabric is a positive step forward for the SFRS. These new facilities have been well received by the personnel who utilise them.

NSDA Appliances

96. In 2022 the Service published the Strategic Asset Management Plan: Fleet 2022-27 (SAMPF), which sets out how the SFRS aims to provide a fit for purpose fleet for the provision of services across the whole organisation. The SFRS’s national Fleet Function manages the procurement and servicing of vehicles used across the Service including the NSDA, allocating and replacing vehicles based on a national policy. The SAMPF and its aspirations need to be considered in the context of the current SFRS risk based 5 Year Capital Programme that includes Fleet, as well as Property and Equipment. The Service faces significant funding challenges impacting on its ability to ensure that its fleet of vehicles remains fit for purpose. These vehicles contribute to the central mission of enabling SFRS to mobilise to emergency events, carrying appropriate numbers of crew, and carrying suitable equipment to deal with the wide range of operational incidents it attends.

97. The appliances that operate across the NSDA are of varying age, but the crews in stations were generally content with their fire appliances, and this was reflected in the generally good condition that we found them in. When a fire stations appliances are made unavailable through servicing schedule requirements or for other maintenance to be carried out, a replacement vehicle is made available for use. These vehicles are known as ‘spare fleet appliances’ and can be of varying model types and age. A consistent observation that was made to us concerned some very aged spare fleet appliances, many of which often fail their basic checks carried out at fire stations before being placed on the run. Common issues, aside from the age of the spare fleet, were that the lockers of these vehicles were not pegged out to carry a full complement of operational equipment, which meant that equipment was often left stored in stations; they often would arrive without hose reel tubing, or in some instances they would be fitted with non-standard hose reel connections. We raised the issue of the spare fleet, some of it more than twenty years old in age, with Assets. It was acknowledged by Assets that the age and condition of spare appliances was not at the levels that the Service is content with. We were informed that extra resource has been allocated within this financial year to purchase twenty new fire appliances and that this would enable less aged appliances to be placed into the spare fleet. The intention is to tackle the issue over time, although Assets could not confirm how many, if any, of these new additions to the spare fleet would be allocated to the NSDA.

Recommendation 10

Assets should review the age and condition of its spare appliance fleet and make provision to reduce and improve it as new vehicles enter service making less aged appliances available.

98. Servicing and maintenance of SFRS vehicles is undertaken at centralised Asset Resource Centres (ARC) across Scotland. The ARCs for the NSDA are located in Dundee and Inverness. We enquired about the possible use of private garage facilities for this purpose, but the Service has carried out comparative cost analysis and the maintenance of its own dedicated workshops within regional ARCs has shown to be the most cost-effective solution. The SFRS does have in place some limited maintenance contracts for its vehicles in particularly remote areas of Scotland including some locations within the NSDA. These contracts would include arrangements for the replacement of vehicle tyres etc which is more cost effective in these circumstances. However, we found examples of remote stations where minor modifications to vehicles had been carried out outwith the SFRS contractual arrangements. An example of such a modification was fire appliance lockers bays being pegged out in a bespoke fashion to accommodate equipment. On reviewing this work, we concluded that it had been done to a high standard of quality and that it provided a good solution for securing operational equipment within the vehicle lockers. As we understand it, this work was carried out with no cost recharge to the Service and that it did not form part of a formal contract. The auto garage that carried out the work is owned by an On Call member of staff and the station did not want to have their fire appliance taken off island for an extended period of time to have the necessary work carried out as this would entail having an inevitably aged, and potentially less reliable, replacement vehicle made available to them. This example demonstrated a resilience and self-reliance to seek solutions to their issues to maintain service. It did also however indicate that some minor works may be possible at remote locations without the need to change over station appliances and have them out of use for potentially extended periods of time.

Recommendation 11

The SFRS should conduct a review of fleet maintenance options and consider if added value and cost savings can be made. They should consider any added benefits that could be achieved through delivering a minor repairs service via local garage establishments in remote and island locations.

99. In common with the West SDA report, our fieldwork came across an example of a Special Operations Response Unit that had been brought into service as a Command Support Unit (CSU). Having viewed the vehicle and compared it to the ideal capabilities of a dedicated CSU, it is understandable that the operational crews who may have to use it at incidents expressed concerns about its suitability. Having raised the issue with Assets we understand that new CSU vehicles have been ordered and are awaiting delivery into the Service. These will be a welcome addition to the operational fleet.

Recommendation 12

A Command Support Unit is a critical appliance for the successful management of operational incidents. The current arrangements for temporary CSUs are unsuitable and the new units should be brought into service as soon as is practicable.

100. Service personnel operate across long travel distances in the NSDA. Like many businesses, the SFRS is in the process of reducing its carbon footprint and the emissions it produces. In doing so it has begun to replace its light vehicle, ‘white fleet’ combustion engine vehicles with Electric Vehicles (EV) along with the recharging infrastructure that is necessary to keep these cars and vans appropriately charged. However, it was widely reported to the inspection team that there were several issues related to the use of EV that were a cause of some concern.

101. Following operational incidents there may be a need for station personnel to access spare stocks of PPE that is kept at strategic holding stations. These stations can be over 50 miles away from some stations that generate the need for the PPE, and they may need to be accessed at any time of the day. It is our understanding that most stations do not have access to a light vehicle and there is a need to make these journeys either in their own private cars, as was widely reported to us, or in an operational fire appliance. Both options carry risk and/or financial cost for individuals or the Service.

102. It is widely accepted that range anxiety related to EV is a genuine cause for concern for drivers. We spoke with a number of personnel who work in support functions within the Service. Many of them use EV to go about their business or to access locations that are remote from their place of work. Many of them told us that it is a cause for concern that the range of EV vehicles may not be sufficient for their travel to undertake work activities, but also that the necessary charging infrastructure to support the effective use of these vehicles may not yet be sufficiently in place across the North of Scotland. As we understand it, representations have been made to Assets to relay these concerns, and they are currently under consideration.

Recommendation 13

The SFRS should review the effectiveness of EV in more remote areas of Scotland. They should consider the charging infrastructure that is necessary to support the use of these vehicles, and local access to charging facilities when they are not located on Service premises. Where necessary, to ensure operational readiness, combustion engine vehicles should be strategically placed for use by SFRS personnel.

NSDA Equipment

103. In 2023, the Service published the Strategic Asset Management Plan (SAMPE): Equipment 2023-28, which sets out how it aims to provide the wide range of equipment, kit and PPE that is necessary for the provision of services across the whole organisation. The SFRS’s national Equipment Function manages the procurement, servicing and repair of equipment used across the SFRS including the NSDA, allocating and replacing it based on a national policy. The SAMPE and its aspirations need to be considered in the context of the SFRS risk-based 5 Year Capital Programme that includes Equipment, as well as Property and Fleet. The Service faces significant funding challenges to ensure that the equipment, kit and PPE it procures and purchases is fit for purpose, and can contribute to the central mission of enabling its operational assets to mobilise and deal with a wide range of emergency incidents.

104. As with the inspections in the East and West SDAs, we found common themes relating to equipment and its testing, repair and servicing. These include a centralised approach to equipment repair; a predominantly paper-based system for the recording of equipment checks at fire stations; the introduction of new fire ground radios which have been well received; the ability to deviate, particularly for On Call stations, from a standard equipment inventory for Service appliances; repeated requests for consideration for the issuing of breaking in and power tools (such as a reciprocating saw) with little or no feedback communications from Assets. It is not our intention to go through these issues again in detail in this section; instead they are considered holistically within the In Focus: Assets section.

105. When we asked operational crews for their views on the availability for use and the standard of their equipment, they were, subject to the above requests, generally content with it. We received many comments that the standard and breadth of the equipment provided was better in many ways than that which was provided by legacy Services before the formation of the SFRS in 2013.

106. There are specialist rescue capabilities, such as water and rope rescue, based at a number of stations within the NSDA. The disposition of these resources is decided nationally and designed to give communities across Scotland equitable access. Some of the capability, such as USAR, DIM and Mass Decontamination was introduced across the UK following the September 11th terrorist attacks of 2001. Some of the appliances and equipment introduced at that time was commented upon to be at the end of its useful operational life due to wear and tear.

Personal Protective Equipment

107. Operational staff across the NSDA provided very positive comments and feedback on the standard of structural firefighting PPE that they are issued with. We found that PPE records were in the main marked up and that they reflected the use of the laundry system that is in place across the SFRS. Where we found instances of PPE records not to be marked up to a standard that the Service would expect, we provided feedback at the time for supervisory officers. While many stations had suitable storage capacity for PPE, this was not always the case. There were many instances of fire stations that had a lack of storage capacity for PPE, and in many On Call stations a lack of separation between PPE storage and station appliance bays and vehicles. Clearly this exposes PPE to vehicle fumes and contamination particulates. We expect that this issue will be further considered by the SFRS as it seeks to provide effective control of contaminants within its fire stations. Operational staff that we talked to have a good awareness of contaminants and a desire to do what they could to adhere to Service guidance, such as it is at the time of writing this report, to mitigate the impacts of it upon themselves and their colleagues. Our findings as they relate to contaminants are set out in the case study ‘A Contaminants Ready Fire Station: Inverness’ within this report.

108. The NSDA covers an area that has been impacted in recent years by protracted wildfire incidents. The SFRS has invested recently in new appliances, kit and equipment to ensure that it is prepared to meet this growing challenge that is linked to climate change. While suitable wildfire PPE has been provided for personnel in key located stations across the SFRS, including the NSDA, we received many comments from personnel whose stations sit adjacent to wildfire risk areas, and from where they are frequently mobilised to assist in tackling these types of incidents. While acknowledging the qualities of their structural fire PPE, personnel note that it is unsuitable for conducting firefighting operations related to wildfires. Using this type of PPE at these incidents can lead to very uncomfortable working conditions for firefighters who relayed to us many instances of overheating. Personnel were also keen to emphasise the impractical nature of standard fire boots for traversing the rough terrain of hills and forested areas. These comments resonate with those that are set out within HMFSI recent thematic report ‘Climate Change: managing the operational impact on fires and other weather related emergencies 2023’, as well as the recent East and West SDA reports. The crews who made these comments reported to us that they could be deployed to these wildfire incidents on a continuous rolling basis over a period of several days. To do so in PPE that they did not consider to be practical for the task was a source of frustration for them. As we have commented above, the SFRS has planned for future wildfire events by pre-positioning kit and equipment at stations. To help underpin the best and most comfortable working conditions for personnel who may attend wildfire incidents, but who do not have a personal issue of the PPE that the Service considers to be most appropriate for that risk, we would urge consideration of the establishment of transportable stocks of wildfire PPE for their use and then return post-deployment.

Recommendation 14

The Service should review the suitability of PPE for personnel who are not from designated wildfire stations, but who are known to provide significant capacity in any response to these incidents. Currently firefighters can access strategic stocks of spare PPE; if necessary, the SFRS should follow a similar route to ensure that personnel who are mobilised to these incidents are dressed to the same standard as their designated station colleagues.

109. In line with the East and West SDA reports, we again received a number of comments regarding the station wear uniform which is issued to SFRS personnel, and which was considered to be of poor quality when compared to that of several years ago.

110. The laundering system for firefighting PPE is a topic that was raised on every visit to operational sites in the NSDA, in this regard there was a consistency of comment across all three SDAs of the Service. Rather than simply reiterate these comments, it was considered appropriate to consider laundry among several other Assets focused topics that we covered during our fieldwork interviews. Laundry of PPE is therefore addressed within the ‘In Focus: Assets’ section in this report.

In Focus: Assets

111. The working relationship between the SFRS Assets team and the operational element of the SDAs elicited much debate and conversation during inspection interviews. It should be stated here that many officers and station based personnel were complimentary about the work that the wider Assets team performs and about the quality of fire appliances, kit, equipment and PPE that they supply and maintain. Many NSDA staff reported that “the kit we have now is better than what we had before the SFRS”. HMFSI is clear that the contributions of Assets have a positive impact and adds value to the operational response of the SFRS. However, we were also informed of many instances of frustration by NSDA personnel with the way that they perceive Assets to operate and deliver its services.

112. Assets were clear that their primary role is to enable the frontline capabilities of the SFRS to be brought to bear when and where they are needed. We were told, “at the end of the day we are here to enable the frontline in all its capabilities. We provide what is requested.” and that this is done by “providing the best vehicle fleet, kit, equipment etc.”. In doing so they contribute towards the mission of the Service. However, there are several topics that regularly come up during interviews that are a cause for concern for many that the Inspectorate speak to. The HMFSI inspection team took note of these issues and returned to the Service to discuss them with senior managers within Assets. In doing so we have made a qualitative assessment of the full spectrum of information available and make observations that we believe are balanced.

113. Senior Assets team members were clear that the issue, replacement or repair of PPE, kit or equipment was not driven at any time by budget. If essential items required to be replaced, then they would be provided as soon as possible when taking into consideration any supply considerations. They did however concede that their team was small and possibly not big enough for the very high demand on their services, i.e. “we don’t sit on repairs (or replacements), but we do have issues with a fairly small team with finite capacity managing the work”. At the time of interview, we were informed that the Assets team was to be bolstered by four new WCs who would focus on operational specialisms and the kit and equipment that is required for these. The hope is that this will lead to quicker response times and alleviate some of the work volume pressures on the small team who currently deal with these.

114. There was a perception among many station based firefighters that equipment can take excessive periods of time to be returned from their local Assets Resource Centre (ARC). Some believed this has had a tangible negative outcome at operational incidents. When the inspection team sought further details about these instances, there was often no recorded details that could be added to the context of the discussion. There were a number of instances of WCs and FDOs who have had to follow up on reasons as to why kit and equipment had not been returned from an ARC to stations as promptly as would have been hoped. On doing so, they were informed of various reasons for these delays, including extended lead time for parts and spares to be made from equipment suppliers. We discussed several specific issues with Assets regarding equipment repair or replacement. We raised the issue of an extended delay of several months to replace hose for a fire appliances’ Ultra High Pressure Lance (UHPL). It was clear that Assets knew the details of the specific issue and were able to offer an explanation that these were not stock held items for the SFRS or indeed for the UK distributor/manufacturer. Assets placed a special order for the hose, which had a circa eight-week delivery time, and purchased a replacement length and an additional stock length to try to ensure it was not an issue in future. Another issue raised was in regard to a station that had two attack branches away for repair for extended periods of time. This issue was not specifically known about by Assets, but there was a belief that it should have been captured, and replacement branches should have been issued. In both examples there appears to have been an underlying lack of communication from Assets to the station personnel in question, but also a failure of personnel to press for an explanation as to why equipment was unavailable for the extended periods of time. We believe that many of the issues relating to Assets that were relayed to us during our NSDA fieldwork could be resolved by a more robust communications and engagement process between the Directorate and the SDAs.

Recommendation 15

Assets should consider the process for the repair or replacement of kit and equipment and introduce a system that gives regular feedback to station based personnel regarding the progress or any delays in the repair or replacement of kit and equipment.

115. There was a perception amongst operational personnel in the NSDA that Assets had been responsible for the curtailment of realistic swift water rescue training using boats with outboard engines. Crews commented that they wanted to exercise on a challenging stretch of water and that this had caused damage to engine prop protection cages. Crews were of the opinion that the cages had done the job that they were designed for and that a stretch of water that has been the scene of incidents previously was able to be used for training. However, on discussing this with Assets they informed us that a significant number of prop guards had been damaged during a short period of time, that this had led to significant expense to repair engine damage to outboard motors and this in turn led to several boats being placed off the run and unable to respond to operational incidents. On hearing of a reduction in availability of these critical water rescue assets, principal officers enquired into the reasons for this and were informed of the situation. The Service came to the decision to protect the integrity of the boats in an effort to maintain their availability for deployment to operational incidents. Based on this, personnel in NSDA stations were asked to consider other bodies of water for training events for water rescue. It is the view of HMFSI that this was proportionate as there needs to be a balance between the value of live training on water and the potential financial costs of this, as well as the risk of putting boats off the run. Again however, a more effective communications and engagement approach from the Assets team may have led to a greater level of understanding about the situation.

116. During our In Focus discussions, we were informed that Assets is in the process of producing a quarterly newsletter which will deliver news on property, fleet and equipment. The draft of the first one is complete and is due for release with the aim of informing staff of updates, new policy and procedure, ongoing works, new appliances and equipment that is being introduced to the Service as well as a range of other good news. This is a welcome development and should ensure greater engagement with the SDAs and their operational stations.

Recommendation 16

While we acknowledge the development of a newsletter by the Assets team, there is a need to actively engage with NSDA personnel on a range of matters. The Assets team should consider, and where necessary review its communications and engagement with the SDAs with a view to informing them of ongoing work and progress across a range of issues. Engagement should be systematic and inclusive to ensure station based issues are able to be resolved and that all partners are informed of progress.

117. SFRS appliances come fully equipped with a standard level of operational equipment to deal with a wide range of operational incidents. The equipment level can be guided by the size of the appliance if it is a traditional fire appliance, or if its station operates the On Call duty system. The equipment loads for RDS and Volunteer stations is normally less than that for WT stations which reflects the reduced range of incidents that appliances at these stations are expected to mobilise to. There are of course exceptions to this and requests for an augmented level of appliance equipment can be made on a case by case basis. We were informed of an instance where a Volunteer station had been issued with a powered combi tool as it was a first call responder to the busy A9 road. While this piece of equipment was considered necessary and a business case for it being issued was accepted, another prepared business case was not progressed by Assets. A tirfor winch was requested after the same Volunteer unit was unable to carry out critical stabilisation at a live operational incident. Following this incident, a business case was prepared and endorsed by the LSO for said piece of equipment to be issued, but the request was refused. When this point was raised in our In Focus discussions with Assets it was not recognised as the request had been denied by another member of the team. Assets did however confirm that they would be content to consider evidenced requests for critical pieces of operational equipment to augment the standard issue of appliance kit.

Recommendation 17

Assets should consider and design a process for business case presentation for the issue of equipment on a case by case basis to the level of a WT station appliance. These cases should be reviewed at an appropriate level and the outcomes clearly communicated back to the SDA, LSO and fire station involved.

118. A regular topic of conversation across all three SDA inspections has been around structural fire PPE. The quality of this PPE was almost unanimously praised and often described as the best that firefighters had been issued with. There were however divided opinions upon the SFRS system for laundering of the PPE, particularly in light of the most recent thinking around mitigating the impact of dirty and contaminated fire kit on the long term health of firefighters, and in accessing spare PPE where kit has been rendered unusable after wear. Many interviewees told us that the turnaround time for fire kit to be laundered and returned to them was reasonable and took around two weeks. There were many others however who reported that two to six weeks for return was common, and we also heard a number of reports where this time period had been considerably longer. Through our discussions with the Assets team we understand that a Service Level Agreement (SLA) is in place between the SFRS and a contractor that delivers specialist laundry services for firefighting PPE. All of the PPE laundry across Scotland is delivered to a site in the central belt with a stipulated seven day turnaround target. We were informed that the SLA meets its target of a 95% turnaround for the PPE.

119. Given that the SLA is within scope for the turnaround time of the laundry service, we considered any associated issues that may lead to delays in station based personnel experiencing delays in the return of their firefighting PPE. Through discussions about the processes that are involved in the preparation, collection and transportation to the laundry site of PPE and its subsequent return to its home stations, we believe that there are several identifiable systemic issues that could be addressed to improve the perception and performance of the system currently in place. There is only one pick up day per week from each fire station for laundry. Should personnel miss this day, through for example an incident occurring the following day that leads to PPE contamination, then a week is effectively added onto the process. The addition of extra pick up days for PPE laundry from stations would offer operational personnel more flexibility and save time in the overall laundry process. We also understand that the fresh laundry gets delivered to central holding stations from where it is distributed to the work location station of its owner. If there is a failure in collecting and redistributing this laundry, then further delays in returns of laundered PPE may be experienced. During the course of our fieldwork for the SDA reports we have witnessed large bags of laundered PPE at station distribution points. Any delay in the pickup of these items again adds time to its final return to owners. The arrangements for the transportation of laundered PPE back to its home station appears to have many variations including by van drivers specifically employed for these types of tasks, use of vans or cars belonging to OCSWCs across the NSDA (including between islands via ferry as needed), by utilising the Service vehicles of FDOs where they are going to stations that they are supervising etc. It seems that the transportation of laundered PPE back to its home station is ad hoc at best and not part of a clearly defined process. It should be noted that we are not criticising the can do, self-reliant approach of staff in the NSDA, quite the opposite. However the lack of a formalised transportation system for the purposes of moving laundered PPE, and it should be noted other items of consumables, kit and equipment which we viewed at a number of locations, adds to the time delays which are experienced by a significant number of operational personnel awaiting its return.

120. A lack of available firefighting PPE for personnel can lead to fire appliances becoming unavailable. Operational personnel across the SFRS have two sets of this PPE. We were told of regular occurrences of fire crews PPE being away for laundering only for their second set to then be exposed to contaminants at operational incidents. In instances such as these the SFRS has a number of ‘holding stations’, which have a stock of spare firefighting PPE that is available for short-term issue and loan to individuals, thus allowing them to be equipped to return to operational duty and their fire appliance to be available to attend further emergency calls. Access to spare kit within the NSDA can often mean extended journey times for the fire appliances and the crew who need it. It is common for 50-mile journeys to be undertaken which takes time to complete and extends the time that fire appliances may remain unavailable for emergency calls.

Recommendation 18

The Service should review the system for collection and return of firefighting PPE laundry. The aim should be to identify opportunities to reduce lost time within the end to end system and to make PPE available for use by operational fire crews as soon as possible. A communication and engagement process should be planned and undertaken to explain the full process to operational personnel.

121. In the recent past there have been issues surrounding the availability of suitably sized kit, and of enough spare kit being available. The SFRS recognised this problem and has invested significant capital funding to bolster the numbers of items available for spare PPE stock. Additionally, Assets took an empirical view of the workforce profile and has provided a suitable mix of sizes to try to ensure what is required at the point of need is available. Should a situation be reached where spare PPE stock is exhausted, it can be made available from central stocks that are held within ARCs. While a journey to an ARC may involve extended travel time, the availability of the required PPE is much more likely. The exception to this is at weekends or outwith normal opening times. In instances such as these there may be local arrangements for ARC managers to open the facility and issue what is required, but this is beyond employee regular terms and conditions and cannot be relied upon as being a fully robust solution to shortages. The Assets team have not made access to ARCs available to on duty FDOs as it seeks to maintain control over the issue of expensive PPE items.

Good Practice 6

Additional structural firefighting PPE stocks have been provided by the SFRS as a result of an identified need and following significant capital investment.

122.The Assets team, while being focused on providing their services, also stressed the importance of managing the expectations of operational response personnel across the SFRS. They are required to take a one Service approach to the provision of kit, equipment and PPE and told us “issues need to be addressed nationally, and we understand that this can cause local frustrations” if a particular need does not appear to be dealt with swiftly enough. Bringing new kit and equipment into service requires Assets to go through a recognised procurement process, place orders, potentially go through manufacturing processes, achieve delivery and to then train for use before placing it into operational service, all of which takes time. The Assets team offered assurance that they are focused on the primary mission to always do their best to support the frontline and ensure fire appliances can be mobilised to deal with emergencies.

123. Whilst we have made recommendations for improvement within this section of the report, we also acknowledge the genuine efforts of the Assets team and recognise their desire to improve and deliver the best service possible to end users.

Operations Control Dundee

124. One of the Service’s three Operations Control (OC) Centres is located in Dundee (DOC) within the NSDA. The DOC is responsible for answering NSDA emergency fire calls, making appropriate appliance mobilisations to deal with operational incidents, managing communications to and from the scene of any incident and for managing the coordination and effective utilisation of appliances for relief duties at these incidents. The role of any of the Service’s three OCs is critical to the effective and efficient management of any incident, they are the first point of contact with incidents and have a crucial role to play until they are safely concluded. As well as managing NSDA calls, the DOC can, when needed, take and manage calls originating from the East and West SDAs. The DOC sits within the Operations function, and as such the NSDA DACO has no management responsibility for this facility.

125. When emergency 999 calls are received at the DOC, appliances are dispatched to the scene of the incident using an IT-based mobilising system. The mobilising systems in use across the three Service OCs are aged, are losing functionality and considered to be at end of life. This end of life status, whilst mobilisations are still made and calls are not lost, is a cause of concern for the DOC staff. At the time of writing this report, the SFRS has procured a new system, and it is expected to be installed and made operational within the next 18 months. While the installation process and training for the new platform will put strain on the OC teams, it is eagerly awaited and expected to provide a robust system for the coming years.

126. The DOC, in common with the other OCs, has a functional management system. OC FDOs have specific roles, and deliver their work outputs based on these, e.g. training, personnel etc. Our recent inspections have queried the effectiveness of the functional management approach for the OCs as it does not, unlike other SFRS stations and facilities, have a single nominated overall manager for a site. It was highlighted as a source of frustration for many of the personnel that we interviewed that they needed to go to several FDOs to deal with issues local to the DOC. The limitations of the current management system have been recognised, and there is an ongoing consultation to amend this to a new model. We understand that the proposed new management structure that the consultation process considers, was not subject to a wide set of views and opinions before it was devised and made public. This consultation exercise has been ongoing for 24 months. Proposal papers for the structure have also been making their way through the SFRS governance system, but again we understand that it has not made sufficient progress to allow it to be enacted. This protracted delay is a source of concern for personnel throughout the DOC as there are significant proposed changes to the make-up of watches and to the lines of FDO management responsibilities.

Recommendation 19

The SFRS should consider the best and most appropriate management structure to address the fundamental management oversight weaknesses of the OCs. Staff should be fully engaged and opinions considered. FDOs should be canvassed for best practice views that can be worked into any final proposal.

127. As we asked DOC personnel how they plan their work cycle it became clear that this is done on a watch basis only with no apparent overarching guidance. Some watches told us that the SCs will review work cycles that forecast activity on a seven-week basis, while also reflecting on the previous period to review watch performance. In effect this approach is similar to that found in many stations who use a seven-week planner for forecasting and planning future activity. The lack of a link to an overall OC guidance plan was confirmed to us. We also understand that an OC audit process, developed in line with the SFRS station audit process, has previously been produced but never implemented. DOC staff told us that areas of performance would be audited for quality assurance purposes, but that no site wide inspections or audits are conducted. HMFSI believe that there should be an OC site audit process for the SFRS, thus ensuring that a point in time assessment of the OCs can be made against agreed criteria.

Recommendation 20

The Service should design and introduce site-specific plans for the OCs, similar to fire station plans, which align to SFRS governance and planning frameworks. Alongside these plans, the OC function should have a workplace audit process designed and modelled on a station audit to allow a full review of the workplace and its processes. The outcomes of the audits should be reported back to the individual sites and any issues raised made the subject of an action/improvement plan.

128. It was clear during fieldwork that the watches within the DOC enjoy their work, and staff feel well supported by their Officers and local FDOs. We noted, not always in a way that is entirely positive for OC staff wellbeing, that the OC team has a culture where no matter the issue to be dealt with that “we just get on with it!”. It was also noted that staffing numbers within the DOC have recently improved, but we were told that there has often been requests for personnel to work overtime hours, fill in for extra shifts and for them to voluntarily take fewer or shortened breaks during work shifts. DOC personnel told us that, in the recent past, minimum crewing levels have at time been reached and worked through. Added to this has been the use of Orange days within the 5 Group Duty System to cover “the cold and flu season and the bonfire night period”, often with no consideration of the additional hours that personnel have been fulfilling via overtime etc.

129. With the ongoing considerations for the new OC management structure, as well as fluctuations in overall staffing numbers, there are a high number of personnel who are fulfilling temporary promotions, some for significant periods of time. This has led to those seeking promotion to become frustrated at what they perceive to be delays in the processes that these would naturally entail. During our fieldwork we were informed by a number of individuals that news on a proposed Crew Commander process has been announced several months before, only for it to then remain unconfirmed for an extended period of time.

130. Traditionally there would be a close relationship between local SDA officers, who would be expected to liaise and work closely during operational incidents, and their colleagues within the OC. As set out previously, the DOC watches feel well supported within their workplace. They did however tell us of a feeling of detachment from the wider SFRS, not feeling as connected to it as they should be, and of feeling undervalued despite the discretionary effort they provide to ensure that the OC functions when staffing is at low or critical levels, as they have been in the recent past. Many DOC staff told us that it was noticeable how infrequently their role is addressed via corporate communications or in Operational Assurance (OA) debrief reports etc.

Recommendation 21

The SFRS should work to ensure that the DOC staff group are actively engaged and communicated with to build ever more positive working relationships.

131. Our West SDA inspection report highlighted the issue of SFRS policy and procedure being introduced but not being fully reflective of the OC function and how they may need to use it. In common with all of the operational sites that we visited in the NSDA, we asked the DOC team about their involvement with OA. It is clear that the OC has an administrative and governance function for OA, and for the collation of the resources that have attended an incident and who may be required to collate information via the Service OA13 pro forma. We found that the DOC diligently compiles OA13 information, but were told that, in common with many other of our interviewees in the NSDA, that they receive no replies back. The DOC has also, as with the other SFRS OCs that the inspection team has recently visited, devised a shadow process that allows them to compile incident information and to host regular debriefs at watch level. Their approach to OA was the most consistent that we found In the NSDA, in that the operational incident information gets compiled, the watch gets debriefed, and learning is collated for capture on individuals PDR records. This is consistent with other OCs. While other operational colleagues do complete OA13 returns, this level of consistency is not as evident within stations. The DOC personnel also told us that when the SFRS OA team compile and host debrief events of significant incidents, that the role of the OC is often overlooked, even when they have undertaken a significant role in the incident. OA is currently the subject of an ongoing inspection by HMFSI, and the role of the OC team will be covered in more detail within the findings of this report.

132. The SFRS UFAS reduction strategies have led to mobilisations to these types of calls being down by over 50% across the country. This is positive and has achieved the intended policy outcomes. However, the UFAS call volume for the OCs remains significant, and this has been acknowledged by the Service. Indeed, we have been told that the time spent on these calls has increased as the call challenging process requires a number of questions to be asked and the answers to them considered before a definite decision to mobilise or not is taken. One curious outcome of the reduction in appliance mobilisations due to UFAS calls that was highlighted to us was the reduction in the time spent by OC firefighters managing emergency calls. It is a statistical fact that the number of operational calls has reduced over the years to date, with the UFAS reduction having a significant further impact upon these. While the OC managers acknowledged the positive outcomes of the UFAS reduction, there was a concern that skills erosion would have to be considered and planned for.

133. In common with other operational staff in the NSDA we found that the level of Service led leadership and management training that the officers of the DOC have accessed in recent years has been low. Preparation for promotion, and development following it, has in the main been via mentoring and development through contact with other DOC officers. While this is commendable, like their colleagues in other operational roles across the NSDA, it is important that the OC staff are able to access a consistent development pathway. This topic is dealt with within the report and the recommendations proposed should equally apply to OC officers.

Impact of UFAS Reduction Policy in the NSDA

134.The introduction of the new UFAS Reduction Policy in July 2023 was referred to in our East and West SDA reports. It was however difficult to quantify the outcomes that it may have been achieving at the time of their publication. While conducting our inspection interviews, we consistently asked about the perceived impacts of the policy and the benefits that it may be releasing. Anecdotally it was widely reported to us that a significant drop in UFAS activity was being experienced across the NSDA. Where there were historic low levels of UFAS calls in more rural communities to sleeping risks such as care homes and hotels, there was no real difference reported to us. In these places UFAS had not been an ongoing generator of high levels of appliance mobilisations, and this remains the case. However, where stations had historically experienced relatively high levels of UFAS appliance mobilisations, personnel told us that they believed that drops of circa 50% were common, and in several instances for stations located close to the whisky industry facilities that these figures were circa 80%. We received data from the SFRS Business Intelligence & Data Services Team (BIDS) that allowed us to compare numbers of operational incidents and UFAS calls for the reporting years 2022/23 and 2023/24. These figures showed that UFAS calls accounted for 58% of incidents in 2022/23 and 50% in 2023/24 due to a reduction in the number of 3,434 of these incident types. Clearly this reduction, which in real terms equates to a 29% fall, is welcome. However, it did not fully explain the anecdotal but consistent information that we were receiving from operational personnel, who indicated a more substantial drop in UFAS mobilisations. To allow this to be better presented we requested full-year data from the BIDS team that would reflect the period that the UFAS Policy had become live, i.e. from July 2023 to the end of June 2024.

This data is presented in Table 1 below:

From the table we can see that for the NSDA, UFAS incidents accounted for 17% of incidents from July 2023 to the end of June 2024, and that this is down from 32% from July 2022 to end June 2023. The 62% reduction in NSDA UFAS incidents within this period demonstrates clearly that the change in strategy has achieved its objective.

135. There was a concern that the On Call duty personnel may experience a drop in income related to the reduced levels of UFAS calls that they attend following the new policy implementation. However, from the responses that we received to this question when it was put to On Call personnel, we can conclude that while there has been a drop in income for some, it was offset by them being able to remain at their primary employment and by mobilising to calls that were more likely to require an emergency response as opposed to an attendance at the scene of an alarm actuation. The Service in the NSDA has also made additional hours available for On Call personnel to conduct station or community safety work. It was recognised by WT and On Call staff that less time spent on UFAS calls meant more time is available for other important work such as training.

Operation of the Incident Command System in the NSDA

136. One of the benefits realised from the reform of the fire service in Scotland was equity of access to resources which includes the full range of specialist appliances that the SFRS can bring to bear at operational incidents via its Incident Command System (ICS). The SFRS has stations and appliances at strategic locations to meet the risk that is present across Scotland. This approach ensures that a suitable mix of appliances, and firefighters with the appropriate skills, can be mobilised to meet foreseeable risk. On the mainland, the road network ensures that additional appliances can be mobilised and reach the locus of incidents even with extended run times. Functional officer roles can also be filled with relative ease on the mainland, again subject to travel times via the road network. Inevitably, for a variety of reasons, this is not the case on the island groups of WIOS. While personnel and appliances can be moved to these islands via aircraft and ferry shipping, this is subject to either scheduled timetables or the activation of MOUs to ensure that logistical moves can be undertaken. It is foreseeable that such moves would take time, and if inclement weather was a significant feature, as it often is on the island groups, these time delays could be significant.

137. While the level of operational activity across WIOS is low, the risk of not being able to populate the ICS with either additional appliances and/or functional officers is clearly known. In instances where additional resources cannot be mobilised in good time the SFRS carries a level of risk that it must either plan for, or accept. It is our view that this should be reflected in the ICS Policy and the associated Standard Operating Procedures, and there should be narrative that explains that functional roles may not be able to be filled at the point of operational contact with an incident.

Recommendation 22

The SFRS should consider how best to reflect the known reality of managing operational incidents using the ICS at remote locations or on islands across Scotland. This should be reflected in the ICS Policy text.

138. During the course of our fieldwork, we heard of several instances where emergency response partners mobilised to SFRS incidents and then self-deployed within what would be considered to be the cordon area. We understand that as well as details being passed to the OA team, that local discussions and an incident debrief with other service providers was held post incident, and that clarifications on roles and responsibilities from both parties were made. It is however a concern that these events continue to take place. We are of the view that the NSDA management team should engage with Service partners to make clear the legislative role of the SFRS and deliver some input regarding how the ICS should operate.

Recommendation 23

The NSDA should actively engage with its local emergency service partners and deliver input on the role of the SFRS at incidents. Partner roles and mutual support should also be clearly set out.

Planning for Risk

139. It was clear from talking with operational personnel across the NSDA that a number of large projects associated with the renewable energy sector were ongoing or in the planning stages. Amongst others they include multiple on and offshore wind farms, Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) sites and connection sites for the cabling system that brings the wind generated energy to a central locus. These projects are important for the country as it meets the climate challenge and the move towards net zero. We were struck by the scale of some of these projects which will either generate renewable energy or form the infrastructure for its collection and onward distribution into the UK energy grid system. Local crews referred to some of these projects as having been classified as Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). It was interesting therefore that the crews for the local stations where these installations are located, or are planned to be located, have had little preparation or training to deal with any incidents that could potentially occur within them. We understand that the SFRS does get informed about these projects, but are not involved in any meaningful way in planning for the risks that they will present when they go live. Locally the NSDA has set up a team to consider the impact that these new sites could have upon their planning and preparedness to meet any new risks that are identified.

Recommendation 24

The SFRS should review its role within the resilience and response planning process for large scale energy renewable systems and similar which could present operational challenges for its crews in future. The Service should put in place a system that allows for the notification of new projects and appropriate processes that would enable the initiation of any response planning, training or future equipment that may be required to meet these challenges.

140. The NSDA is home to multiple Scotch whisky distilleries of varying size and scale. Whisky exports were valued at £5.4B in 2024 and formed 22% of all UK food and drink exports. Sites that produce and/or store whisky will have a number of regulatory requirements to fulfil to ensure that the site risks are controlled. NSDA operational staff will conduct regular visits to these locations for familiarisation and exercising. During our interviews as we discussed training and planning for these sites, we were offered no specific details of arrangements that are likely be in place to deal with operational incidents at them. Given the economic importance of them, we were surprised at the lack of forthcoming details of how planning arrangements could or would be enacted in the event of an incident at one of these numerous locations. As we discussed the regular engagement that the NSDA has with these sites, it was not clear to us that ownership of risk, relating to potentially not having suitable and full arrangements in place, had been fully set out for the various distillery owners. We believe that there is a need to set out these risks in plain language, including explaining the time that it could potentially take to get appropriate SFRS resources on site, in the event of any potential incident.

Recommendation 25

The SFRS should actively engage the owners of Whisky distilleries in the NSDA to discuss risk details and ownership in the event of an incident at their sites.

141. Scotland has many dock, port and marina sites of varying size, and many of these are located within the NSDA. The ships that frequent Scottish ports, including those within the NSDA, include large cruise liners that carry over 5,000 passengers and crew. We found a similar situation as was highlighted within the West report, i.e. that no ship firefighting training or courses have been delivered within the Service for a number of years. Despite the inevitable erosion of skills and reduction in capacity this will have brought about, there is still an expectation that SFRS personnel would be called to deal within any incidents on ships which are termed as being ‘alongside’ i.e. in harbour. Previously across Scotland there was a trained cadre of operational personnel who could deliver an effective response to a marine incident, this is no longer the case. HMFSI is aware that, following the issue being highlighted, there are plans to reinvigorate Tactical Ship Firefighting courses and to equip operational personnel with the necessary skills to deal with ship based incidents.

Recommendation 26

The ongoing planning within the SFRS to reintroduce Tactical Ship Firefighting courses should include consideration of the need that presents itself in the NSDA.

Operational Assurance

142. The SFRS has in place an OA Policy and associated procedures that aims to gather information and “effective feedback and review of performance at operational incidents and training events to influence future practice, enhance performance and improve firefighter safety”. HMFSI has undertaken an inspection into OA across the SFRS and the outcomes of that will be covered in more detail within that report which is due for publication in summer 2025. OA however is a topic which is covered in the SDA series of inspections, including this one. The Service OA processes involve pre-incidents, thematic and station audits. These consider levels of station preparedness, during incident monitoring processes by FDOs, and post-incident ‘hot debriefs’ and structured debriefs. Station-based operational staff within the NSDA were generally but not universally aware of the OA processes, how debriefs work and how information from station audits and operational incidents is collated. Watch officers and FDOs had good levels of awareness of the Operational Assurance Recording and Reporting System (OARRS) and reported that they would know how to input information into it. The Service has a small, dedicated department who request and collate OA information, compile and deliver structured debrief reports and any presentations that may follow, and also issue regular operational updates based on OA information.

143. We can conclude from our fieldwork that station audits are conducted and that their findings are reported back to local management who initiate any action plan outcomes that may be required to be undertaken to address identified deficiencies. It was not always clear that the outcomes of these audits were reported back to stations in a consistent, or sometimes timely way. At present there is an informal briefing post audit for the on duty WC and, in most cases we were informed of, a follow up informal email to confirm outcomes. Station watch personnel often did not know or had not been informed of any details of the audit outcomes. Many WCs commented that the current station audit process may not indicate the true levels of preparedness. WCs indicated that they would welcome no notice, or limited notice, station audits as they believe this approach gives a better indication of the true levels of preparedness at a station, as well as being a driver for raising standards more generally. Currently a snapshot in time within stations is achieved by the audits, however, this is a snapshot that follows several weeks’ notice of the upcoming event and a programme of preparation for it.

144. During incident monitoring for OA is designated as a functional role within the ICS. The NSDA FDOs were all familiar with the role with a number having fulfilled it in live operational settings. It was a concern that the role of OA officers at incidents, outside hot debriefing, was not known about or understood by the personnel at a number of stations in the NSDA. This was particularly the case on the island groups of WIOS. While this was a concern, it may be understandable within the context of the Service being unable to fully populate the functional roles within the ICS as it would more readily be able to do on the mainland. We consider this topic further within the body of the report.

145. Post-incident reviews fall largely into either hot or structured debriefs. We found that NSDA operational staff were very conversant with and regularly conducted a hot debrief at the conclusion of Level 1 (L1) incidents. The WCs or FDOs who undertook these debriefs would summarise any notable issues related to the incident and use the session as a health and welfare check also. While these L1 incidents make up the bulk of the operational activity that is undertaken by the SFRS, it was not clear that any organisational learning was being formally captured from them.

146. Following the conclusion of Level 2 and Level 3 incidents, an OA13 should be completed by all attending FDOs and OICs of operational appliances utilising the OARRS. We found that the OA13 process was generally followed, but there was criticism of it due to a perceived lack of feedback that the originators of the data receive. This lack of feedback has led to a level of frustration and disengagement with the process, one officer summed it up by commenting that in terms of OA “the SFRS is good at collating information, but not good at disseminating it”. We received several comments that the relatively small size of the OA team, their list of responsibilities and the volume of incident information that they will deal with may be reasons for the perceived low level of engagement. HMFSI observes the TSA Board meeting and notes that the OA process is well considered and clearly has learning outputs that improve outcomes from operational incidents that have occurred across the SFRS.

147. It was acknowledged by NSDA personnel that the Frontline Update notifications and Urgent Instructions are dealt with as a priority with watch information sessions normally held to fully debrief and understand their content. Where the Frontline Updates did receive criticism, it was due to them not being published on a frequent enough basis, and that they were considered to be made overly generic through the removal of operational context and consequently losing some of the learning value of the incidents or events that they are based upon. We also came across examples where local debriefs were being collated and hosted based upon the structure of the OA13 process, these being in lieu of output generated by the OA team.

Service Modernisation

148. The Service is currently engaged in considering the next phase of its modernisation process following the temporary removal of 10 fire appliances from stations across Scotland, including 2 from the NSDA. While NSDA personnel were well aware of the ongoing Service Delivery Review programme and its associated ongoing public consultation, we found that many were not overly concerned about the potential impacts upon themselves or their fire stations from any future changes. Many acknowledged that the SFRS must make changes due to budgetary pressures and a changing risk and operational activity profile that needs to be addressed. Across the NSDA there are a number of On Call stations that have difficulty in maintaining the station TOM and others who have low levels of operational activity. Despite this, many of the personnel at these stations reflected that they may be insulated from any potential changes given their geographical remoteness, and an ongoing need for the SFRS to have in place an adequate operational response to emergency calls in line with the Act.

149.We asked a number of LA executive officers and elected members for their views on any potential future changes in line with SSRP. They told us that they would not wish to lose any local SFRS resources, but they understood that like many other public services, the Service has to address its own budgetary issues. The key to any future change for them, as they advised us, would be a comprehensive communication and engagement process well in advance of any proposed changes.