Inspection of Operational Assurance in the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service

105. The Service arrangements for during incident OA are contained within the GIN - During Incident Operational Assurance⁽²⁸⁾. The GIN details that the ‘SFRS has a statutory duty to manage the workplace safely. Part of that duty, defined by the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (1999), is a requirement to review workplace activity. In the case of the SFRS, this also includes the requirement to review operational activity on the incident ground’. We have identified that the three main components of the process are Active Monitoring (AM), OA Support or Mentoring roles, and the role of the OAO.

106. In addition to the GIN detailed above, the Service also maintains a Control Operating Procedure (COP) – Flexi Duty Officer and Principal Officer Mobilising document⁽²⁹⁾, which details that the SFRS should ensure a professional and effective response be made to meet the full range of incidents which may be encountered. Mobilising such a response should guarantee the appropriate deployment of resources to ensure operational crews can undertake a safe system of work. It further details that the speed and weight of response for an incident is important but consideration must also be given to ensure the most appropriate type of resource, is mobilised at an early stage. It accepts that most incidents are likely to be dealt with safely and effectively by first attending crews. If, however an incident escalates, FDOs and/or PO will be informed of or mobilised to incidents by OC in accordance with the principles of the ICS. It details that ‘FDOs and POs may be informed of, or mobilised to, incidents for a variety of reasons. On some occasions, this will be pre-defined for specific incident types or to support the ICS.’

107. The Service has five main incident levels, Level 1 to Level 5, which is based primarily upon the number of pumping fire appliances that are mobilised to the incident, as detailed in Table 2.

Table 2 - Comparison of Incident Levels and Pumping Appliances

108. The increased number of pumps normally correlates to the type, size, scale and complexity of the incident. Most incidents will require a Level 1 response, with a CC, WC or SC as the IC. The structured incident debriefing triggers are based predominantly upon the level of incident, with the requirements correlating to it being either a Level 1 (L1) incident, Level 2 (L2) or 3 (L3) incidents or a Level 4 (L4) and above incident (L4+).

Active Monitoring

109. AM is where a FDO gathers pre-attendance information, monitors incident radio messages and, using professional judgement and/or experience, acts where necessary. The decision to start and stop AM is communicated to OC to ensure FDOs are contacted correctly for message acknowledgments. AM requires the FDO to be proactive in the gathering of information through the monitoring of incident messages and related information via the main scheme fireground radio.

110. When an FDO is ‘informed’ by OC of an incident, AM is considered best practice and adopted, whenever possible. AM facilitates early FDO mobilisation, not only for the purposes of OA, but also for mentoring and support. AM is only used for incidents where OC notify an FDO for ‘information only’. Upon receiving notification of an incident, the FDO informs OC if they intend to monitor the incident via the main scheme radio. OC will thereafter contact the FDO via radio for confirmation of messages and not via pager or phone.

111. During AM, an FDO is not classed as ‘assigned’ to the incident they are monitoring and may be mobilised to another incident by OC, as required. In these circumstances, the next nearest FDO of the same level is informed of the initial incident to undertake AM. When an FDO decides, they are no longer required to monitor the incident, they inform OC of this decision by passing a message over the radio, stating they are no longer actively monitoring the incident. This will be recorded in the incident log by OC. Where an FDO decides to mobilise to an incident based on their assessment of the incident information, they inform OC of their intention to mobilise, whereupon the next level FDO is informed and that next level FDO will take on the AM of the incident.

112. In general, we found that the process of AM was followed on a regular basis and used routinely as a tool to support the IC. Staff at all levels believed that AM enhanced IC and provided a higher degree of OA than there had been historically. Staff cited that on occasion they had been asked to monitor more than one incident at the same time. Staff felt that this practice had reduced considerably and was not so much of an issue as it had been previously. Staff also reported that there had generally been no training or development to prepare them for the process of AM, this feedback was mainly consigned to SCs who were at the initial stages of their career and had made the move from supervisory to middle manager level recently. These staff predominantly fed back that there was limited development for the role preparation overall, which is consistent with earlier findings of HMFSI. They did feedback that the command group learning and support processes were positive, which was again consistent with earlier findings.

113. Lasty, it was noted that AM was used throughout the SFRS geographical area, as the main scheme fireground radio system provides near perfect coverage and would seem an adequate tool for the purpose. However, this use of the main scheme radio would seem to have allowed the transition between AM and IC to become blurred, specifically for very remote rural areas where travel distances and access to islands can be problematic and lengthy. FDOs monitoring incidents remotely from their location used the AM process to informally move into IC on occasions. Although not a potential critical failing, there was a sense that AM was being used as a crutch to support the ICS for remote areas, where investment in other technology and tools, such as body-worn cameras etc., may be more effective and efficient for IC.

OA and Mentoring

114. On arrival at smaller incidents (Level 1), an FDO is expected to assess the incident and, based on information received or the nature of the incident, decide to either assume command or remain in attendance for OA or Mentoring. If the decision of the first attending FDO is to take charge or carry out OA or mentoring, the next-level FDO will continue to actively monitor the incident until the indicators suggest AM is no longer required. The OAD undertake a daily review of incident activity and where a FDO takes on an OA or mentoring role at an incident, they may be issued with an OA06 via OARRS. The OA06 is an incident review form completed from observation specifically in an OA role, utilising the OA07A/B documents. Where OAD do not issue an OA06 following the daily activity review, FDOs who have captured learning at an operational incident can still submit their findings on OARRS and there is no requirement to wait on an OA06 to be issued.

115. We found that FDOs attending incidents actively decided to either take command of the incident or remain for OA or mentoring, as it is a defined function with the ICS. This was generally well received by subordinate commanders although the decision making and motivation for doing one or the other was sometimes misunderstood and could potentially be communicated better between the command levels. It would appear from the guidance provided that remaining in an OA role is very much an ORL tool, whilst remaining for the mentoring role was used predominantly for supporting individual learning and developing competence of the mentee. It was unclear whether staff were aware of or could make the distinction between the two.

116. When remaining for OA or mentoring, FDOs seemed comfortable providing feedback with the predominant focus being on individual learning as opposed to ORL. This position was normally illustrated by the limited examples given of FDOs voluntarily completing OA06 forms and only doing so if prompted by the OAD. Mentoring and the resultant completion of competence paperwork, as well as generally supporting more junior commanders, seemed a focus and is commendable. However, this led us to the conclusion that FDOs remaining in attendance for the OA role, even when declared as such, was not an effective and efficient ORL tool for smaller incidents.

117. We also found that there was a confusing mix of terminology used by officers that did not provide confidence of a clear delineation and understanding between remaining for OA or providing Mentoring. Different phrases ranged between operational review, mentoring and support, tactical advice and operational support, which is potentially an indication of the need for improved learning and development as detailed previously.

Operational Assurance Officer

118. For larger incidents, Level 2 and above (L2+) or when requested by the IC, an FDO is mobilised specifically to undertake the role of OAO. As detailed in the GIN, the primary role of the OAO is to support the command team to ensure a safe conclusion of the incident. Where, on arrival at the incident, the OAO is required to perform a more risk-critical role within the command team, the IC can decide to reassign them. The details of the role change are passed immediately to OC, who should also be informed whether or not a further OAO is required to attend. Where an additional OAO is not required, the original OAO role should be re-instated as soon as reasonably practicable. The OAO role is designed to provide the necessary independent level of assurance at operational incidents. The OAO will:

a. be minimum role of SC;

b. use the step-by-step guidance provided in OA action checklist templates, utilising forms OA07A and OA07B to ensure a standardised approach;

c. provide support to the IC;

d. undertake OA duties when appropriate to do so in accordance / agreement with the IC;

e. observe operational activity;

f. observe decisions made by the IC and command team;

g. observe operational tactics;

h. correct any safety-critical issues immediately and inform the IC;

i. provide feedback to the IC on safety-critical issues, areas of concern and notable practice;

j. where applicable, remind the IC of the requirement to initiate the Post-incident Support Procedure (PISP); and

k. on completion of the incident, submit all operational learning using form OA06 (Incident Review) on the OARRS.

119. The gathering of OA-related information on the incident ground is informed using the OA07A Action Check list, OA07B Aide Memoire and captured utilising the OA06 form. These forms provide the OAO with common templates to ensure a consistent approach to the assurance of activities across the Service. The awareness and use of these documents was positive, FDOs routinely detailed that they had hard copies in their vehicle and would expect to use them if and when asked to be an OAO. It should be noted that the C&C benchmark process identified that the OA07A should be reviewed and updated with NFCC good practice guide information included and will conclude by 2025.

120. There was some negative feedback related to the complexity of the OA07B form, but this mainly related to the number of fields that needed completed. Again, improvement within the C&C benchmark process provided the impetus to review and update this form with NFCC good practice guide information included. Finally, another recommendation from the C&C benchmark process was the identified need for a digital reporting form to make assessment and reporting easier on the incident ground. The target completion date for this recommendation was deemed unattainable due to ICT restrictions and this remains open. There was no overwhelming evidence to suggest staff thought that this would be a benefit one way or the other.

121. The information gathered on the OA07 form is transferred to the OA06 form and submitted into OARRS, which is then forwarded to the IC for debrief and personal development purposes. We found sporadic evidence of ICs receiving a completed OA06 form and were not convinced of routine normalised use. The Service provided partial data for completed OA06 forms for the period of 2018/19 to 2022/23 which indicated that this process is being completed to a degree. However, the Service was unable to provide completion rate data to contrast with the actual number of incidents, or evidence to support the ongoing use of OA06 information for debriefing and/or trend analysis toward ORL.

122. As detailed previously the OAO is automatically mobilised for L2+ incidents, as well as on request for smaller incidents. The OAO is deemed to be a functional officer that supports the initial command team and is mobilised by OC. Other functional officers may include a Safety Officer, a Command Support Officer, an Operations Commander and a Firefighter Safety Resource Officer. Depending on the size, scale and nature of the incident, this team can be augmented with additional officers who have specific training and can give tactical advice to the IC. These FDOs are called Tactical Advisors (TacAds). All these officers can attend the incident ground at varying times due to the location of the incident and the starting location of being mobilised. The need for some or all these officers can understandably place a burden on resourcing and attendance times at incidents. As such, the IC has discretion to use or reassign arriving officers on a needs and risk basis.

123. The ICS within the Service is a very mature system, which is initiated routinely and consistently for all levels of incident. Since the OAO is normally only mobilised for L2+ incidents, there was a varying degree of exposure to this role and experience was normally consigned to staff who had been an FDO for some time. Of the staff who had experienced the role, there was consistent feedback that the OAO would normally be the role that would be reassigned dynamically by the IC at an incident and occasionally not then reinstated, potentially due to competing priorities and resourcing issues. The guidance does not state that the IC must reinstate the OAO.

124. In addition, the OAO is required to be a minimum SC, which indicates a higher degree of responsibility and status on the fireground, as detailed in the GIN where it states, that there is a requirement to provide an independent level of assurance at operational incidents. It was confirmed by OC that there is no requirement for the role to be a competent or substantive SC and as such can result in relatively inexperienced FDOs being assigned and exposed to situations where they are required to assure FDOs who are at times much more senior and more experienced. An extreme example could be that of a not-yet competent, non-substantive, newly promoted SC being assigned OAO to an incident where a substantive competent AC with numerous years’ experience is IC. The C&C benchmark process reviewed the role and concluded that the FDO level was appropriate for the OAO and that ICL 2 training was appropriate training and qualification for the role. However, their analysis did not identify any issues with the SC role potentially being non-substantive and not yet competent.

125. Staff mostly reported that they had never experienced conflict being put in this position and that personal relationships normally defused any possible tension. It does however raise the question as to whether a role that is meant to provide an independent level of assurance should potentially be so junior to the level of command being applied and that competence in role is not a prerequisite. In addition, there was also a perception that the perceived sacrificial nature of the role and therefore lower command status could be deemed to reduce the credibility and utilisation of OA and the OAO.

126. We have detailed previously that the learning and development for OA appears to be limited within the Service. However, the OAO role is one of the aspects better understood by middle and strategic managers. It is believed that this is partly due to new SCs understanding that they may be asked to fulfil the role and therefore undertaking a degree of self-learning and preparation. We also found evidence that the OAO role formed part of the TFoC FDO OA module, the ICL2 syllabus as well as local and informal FDO development within either management or command teams. That said, we got a sense that this development had gaps particularly around a consistent approach to acquisition learning, understanding of OA responsibilities and process that would assist new FDOs in role who may have to fulfil the OAO.

127. It is interesting to note that the OAO is an assigned role for L2+ incidents and has the responsibility to provide a necessary independent level of assurance at operational incidents. Yet, aside from completing the OA06 and returning it to the IC, they appear to play no significant part in the debrief process. The responsibility for conducting debriefs lies with the IC but we feel that failure to utilise the OAO in this process diminishes the potential learning process, inhibits support for the IC and reinforces the culture of being the first role sacrificed on the incident ground.

128. We found that the OAO was a particularly good concept but that it seemed to struggle with an identity, between being deemed part of the initial functional command team or the role potentially being something more akin to that of a TacAd. We believe there is an opportunity for the role to add real value, as a champion for learning and to assist ICs with debrief, but the culture of it being sacrificial on the incident ground and potential limits to the experiential credibility of the FDO assigned, appear to diminish the role.

Recommendation 5

We recommend that the OAO role be reviewed to ensure development is provided, correct competence is assigned and involvement in the OA debrief process is ensured to appropriately support ORL and the IC.

129. As detailed previously OCs are a key component within the OA process and as such are included within the ethos of the OA Policy. The nature of the role within the Service, whilst operational, does normally include attendance on the incident ground and as such, many of the aspects of the During-Incident GIN do not apply. Nonetheless, there is a cadre of OC FDOs who operate within a similar command group structure and are required to attend a designated OC site when certain operational triggers dictate. We found that it was normal practice for the OC FDOs to AM calls and activity levels of their designated OC. The OC FDOs would routinely attend OC when formal triggers required them to do so but also complemented this with attendance when they felt there was a need for additional support. Staff reported that whilst this attendance was normally informal, it provided a welcome level of supervision and support.

130. Many of the cells within the existing OA06 form are specific to incident ground attendance and do not apply directly to OC operational procedure or systems. We were pleased to note that OC have developed their own version of the OA06 form (OA06OC) in order that they can formally capture learning from FDO attendance so that learning and improvement can be identified. This form is not accommodated within the OARRS and the input and output are administered by the OC management team. This innovation was pleasing to observe and OC staff should be commended for it. However, it is disappointing to note that OC and their role in operations is not subsumed within the holistic OA systems and as such ORL may be less efficient and effective.

Area for Consideration 10

The Service should consider how integrated OC is within the current OA processes and ensure that OC staff are fully involved in the development and review of future ‘during incident’ process change.